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Book Review Essay 
Was the Right to Keep and Bear Anns Conditioned 
on Service in an Organized Militia? 
THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMs, OR, How THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT FELL SILENT. By H. Richard Uvillerf and William G. 
MerkeJ.lt Durham: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. xii, 340. 
$19.95. 
Reviewed by Randy E. Barnett' 
Those who deny that Ihe original meaning of the Second Amendment protected an 
individual right to keep and bear arms on a par with the righls of freedom oj speech, press, 
and assembly no longer claim that the amendment refers only to a "collective right" of states 
/0 maintain their mililias. Instead, they now claim thaI Ihe right, although belonging 10 
individuals, was conditioned all service in an organized militia. With the demise of organized 
militias. they canlend, Ihe right losl any relevance 10 constitutional adjudication. In this 
Essay. I evaluate the case made for this histarical claim by Richard Uviller and William 
Merkel in their book, The Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment Fell 
Silent. I also evaluate their denial that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protected an individual right to arms unconditioned on militia service. I find bolh claims in­
consistent with the available evidence of original meaning and also, perhaps surprisingly, 
Wilh existing federal law. 
Who says that even heated conflicts over constitutional meaning can 
never progress? Over the past ten years, the intellectual clash between those 
who claimed that, at the time of the founding, the ''right to keep and bear 
arms" protected by the Second Amendment was a "collective right" of the 
states to preserve their militia and those who maintain instead that it origi­
nally referred to an individual right akin to the others protected in the Bill of 
Rights has been resolved. That the individual right view prevailed defini­
tively is evidenced by the fact that no Second Amendment scholar, no matter 
how inimical to gun rights, makes the "collective right" claim any more. All 
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now agree that the Second Amendment originally referred to the right of the 
individual.! 
Indeed. the fact that the collective right theory was once so confidently 
advanced by gun control enthusiasts2 is on its way down the collective mem· 
ory hole as though it had never been asserted. With its demise, the intellec­
tual debate over the original meaning of the Second Amendment has turned 
in a different direction. Although now conceding that the right to keep and 
bear anns indeed belongs to individuals rather than to states, almost without 
missing a beat, gun control enthusiasts now claim with equal assurance that 
the individual right to bear anns was somehow "conditioned" in its exercise 
on participation in an organized militia. 
The "militia-conditioned individual right" theory represents an advance 
for the anti-gun-rights position. It obviates (a) the copious evidence. both 
direct and circumstantial. that "the right to keep and bear arms" belonged to 
individuals) and (b) the lack of any direct evidence that the Second 
Amendment protected some sort of a never-very-well-specified power of 
states, while (c) allowing opponents of gun rights to maintain, as they did 
with the "collective right" theory. that the Second Amendment is irrelevant 
to the constitutionality of modem gun laws. But is the theory supported by 
the available evidence? 
The latest to make this historical claim are Richard Uviller and William 
Merkel. ]n their book, The Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the 
Second Amendment Fell Silent, Uviller and Merkel reject the collective right 
theory and characterize the Second Amendment "right to keep and bear 
arms" as an individual right.4 However, they further claim that, because the 
right to arms may be exercised only while participating as part of an organ­
ized militia,S its existence as a constitutional right is conditioned on the 
continued existence of a well-regulated militia. With the demise of the or­
ganized militia, so too has vanished the right to keep and bear arms. In their 
I. The viewpoint of Uviller and Merkel is representative: "[W]e cannot jOin .. .in the 
contention that the eonstillltional right to arms belongs to the states rather than to natural 
persons . . . . This reading is, we think, misguided." H. RICHARD UViLLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, 
THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 179 
(2002). 
2. E.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment,]1 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
]09, 408 (1998) (asserting that "to the extent original intent matters, the hidden history of the 
Second Amendment strongly supports the collective rights position"). 
]. For a succinct summary of this evidence, which has been developed by scholars over the past 
ten or more years, sec Uniled SIl1fes v. Emerson, 270 F.]d 20], 236--59 (5th Cir. 2001). 
4. UVtLLER & MERKEL, supro note I, at 2] ("From the text as well as a fair understanding of 
the contemporary ethic regarding arms and liberty, it seems to us overwhelmingly evident that the 
principal purpose of the Amendment was to secure a pewnal, individual entitlement to the 
possession and use of arms."). 
5. M at ] I ("To return to our central theme, then, the individual right to keep and bear anns 
that is secured in the Second Amendment in our analysis is a right without application outside the 
context of service in state or federal militia."), 
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words, "historical developments have altered a vital condition for the 
articulated right to keep and bear anns.',6 
In this Essay. I will comment briefly on the authors' interpretive 
methodology before moving on to discuss specific problems with their effort 
to interpret the Second Amendment. One of the peculiarities of the modem 
debate over the Second Amendment is its single-minded preoccupation with 
the issue of original meaning or original intent. This is odd because, to my 
knowledge, none of the right-limiting theorists are themselves originalists, 
and consequently they would surely not limit, for example, their interpreta­
tion of the First Amendment by its original meaning. But as the modem aca­
demic debate over the Second Amendment is entirely a historical one, in this 
Essay I limit my attention to this issue. 
I will confine myself to evidence, some previously unconsidered in this 
debate, that specifically disproves that the Second Amendment protected a 
militia-conditioned individual right. I do not reiterate here the other direct 
and circumstantial evidence that supports an individual, as opposed to a 
"collective," right, but the full strength of the individual-right position cannot 
fully be appreciated without taking that evidence into account. 7 
L The Authors' Originalism 
Uviller and Merkel (hereinafter "the authors") are to be commended for 
explicitly discussing their method of interpretation.s Few law professors and 
even fewer historians so much as attempt this. Unfortunately, I found their 
discussion of interpretation rather confused. Increasingly, originalists like 
myself focus entirely on the original meaning of the text-the meaning that a 
reasonable speaker of the language would have attached to the words at the 
time of the text's enactment.9 What did "militia" mean in 179 I? Or "well­
regulated" or "arms" or "bear" or "right" or "the people"? Of course, speak­
ers then, like speakers today, would be influenced by the context in which a 
particular word or phrase is used. For example, because of the context of the 
Second Amendment, we can be quite sure that the term "arms" refers to 
weapons, not the appendages to which our hands are attached. 
Discerning the original public meaning of the text requires an 
examination of linguistic usage among those who wrote and ratified the text 
as well as the general public to whom the Constitution was addressed. 
6. ld. at 35. 
7. See Emerson, 270 f.3d at 236-59 (surveying that other evidence). 
8. VVILLER& MERKEL,supra note I,af 147-67. 
9. I explain the version of originalism described in this Pan in RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTlnmON: THE PRESUMPTION OF UBERTY 89-130 (2004) [hereinafter 
BARNETT, RESTORING" There, I defend original-meaning originalism as entailed by the 
commitment to a written constitution-a strucrural fearure of the U.S. Constirution (like federalism 
or separation of powers) that is needed to impose law on those who make, enforce, and interpret 
legislation that they then impose on the citizenry. for a written constitution to fulfiUthe functiOn of 
providing a higher law, its meaning must remain the same until it is properly changed. 
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Evidence of specialized meaning or intent by framers or ratifiers is only 
relevant if it is shown that such specialized meaning would have been known 
and assumed by a member of the general public. Where more than one con­
temporary meaning is identified, it becomes necessary to establish which 
meaning was dominant. Any such historical claim is an empirical one that 
requires actual evidence of usage to substantiate. If possible, one should un­
dertake a quantitative assessment to distinguish Donnal from abnormal 
usage.IO 
Of course, once discerned, the original public meaning of the .text, like 
the public meaning of laws enacted yesterday, must be applied to the facts of 
particular cases. Though general language of the sort used in the 
Constitution may exclude many possible outcomes, often it does not dictate a 
unique result, thus leaving to those actors that apply original meaning to par­
ticular cases and controversies considerable discretion in developing legal 
doctrines. This activity of applying meaning to cases by means of intennedi­
ary doctrines is better described as constitutional cons/nlclion, rather than as 
interpretation of text.ll The need for construction is Ihe unavoidable cost of 
using language, especially general abstract language, to guide behavior. On 
the other hand, the benefit of general language is that, even with no devialion 
from its original meaning, it can last a very long time without becoming anti­
quated. 
Sometimes it sounds like the authors are endorsing an original-public­
meaning approach, but that is not what they practice. In particular, the au­
thors present very little evidence of the public meaning of the words used in 
the Constitution and, where disagreement exists, little quantitative evidence 
by which to distinguish dominant from deviant meaning. They seem instead 
to be searching for what is better described as original intent, rather than 
original meaning. 
Those originalists who favor original intent want to fill the gaps in the 
original public meaning and cabin the discretion of those engaged in con­
struction of abstract provisions by appealing to the specific intentions of 
those who either wrote or ratified them. This version of originalism has been 
10. I offer elsewhere such a quantitative assessment of the meaning of the words "commerce" 
and "regulate." Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning o/the Commerce C/Ollse, 
55 ARK. L REv. 847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning a/the Commerce C/OIIse, 68 
U. CHI. L REV. 101 (2001) [hereinafter Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause]. 
Such a quantitative survey is not always possible, however, given the state of the evidence of the 
particular word at issue. For example, the term "necessary" is too common to establish by 
quantitative survey a dominant public meaning to which the Necessary and Proper Clause must 
have refeHed. One must then fall back on more traditional reliance on statements of various 
participants in the historical period about the clause in question. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The 
Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (ZOO3) (analyzing 
statements made by Madison, Hamilton, Jcfferson, Marshall, and others for evidence of the original 
meaning of the words "necessary" and "proper"). 
I I. On the distinction between interpretation and construction, see BARNElT, supra note 9, at 
118-30. 
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roundly criticized for reasons that I shall not repeat here, many of which I 
think are sound.12 Given the fact that the Framers did not actually cantem· 
plate most instances in which their words would be applied, in practice the 
search for specific original intentions usually consists of what I call 
"channeling the framers" to discern what they ''would have" thought of a 
particular case or controversy. This converts originalism from a historical 
and factual inquiry into a speculative and counterfactual one. There is sim­
ply no factual answer to the question of what the founders would have 
thought of a particular matter. For this reason, such claims can neither be 
empirically established nor refuted. 
While in places. the authors appear to reject this approach-for 
example, when they repeatedly cite the work of H. Jefferson Powell with 
approval13-this rejection is not practiced consistently,14 as demonstrated by 
their heavy and uncritical reliance on the works of such original-intent au­
thors as Raoul Berger.15 The authors also seem to be unaware that the 
historical evidence cited by Powell actually supports the conclusion that the 
founding generation, while rejecting original-intent originalism, ended up 
favoring original-meaning interpretation.16 
Finally, in contrast with both original-meaning and original-intent 
originalists, there are the new fangled "translation theory" originalists, such 
as Larry Lessig and William Michael Treanor, who start with original 
meaning or intent (it is not always clear which) to discern the principles un­
derlying the text, and then purport to "translate" those principles-but not the 
text itself-into the modem day context.11 While this does not sound like the 
method that the authors endorse, nor practice in most cases, they nevertheless 
cite Lany Lessig's work with approval without seeming to appreciate the 
difference between his approach and that of other originalists.18 
As I said. their discussion of methodology is confusing, but perhaps no 
more so than the well-known historian Jack Rakove, a nonoriginalist. whose 
discussion of interpretive methodology the authors say they found heipful.19 
12. Seeid. at 89-91, 113-16. 
13. UVTLLER& MERKEL. supra nOli:: I, a1148, 154,296 n,6, 299 n.36. 
14. See, e.g., id. at 98 ("By inference, as well as from the record of debate in the House, the 
process casts light on the Amendment's intended meaning."). 
15. See, e.g., id. at 205-06 (discussing Berger's criticism of Professor Akhil Reed Amar's 
thesis related to the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on the Second Amendment). 
16. See BARNETT, supra note 9 ,  at 94-100. 
17. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
STAN. L. REv. 395, 400 (1995) (arguing that the context in which text was created, along with the 
wntext in which text must be applied, should be considered in order to understand the text's 
meaning); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding o/the Takings Clause and the 
Political Process, 95 COLUM. l. REv. 782, 859-80 (1995) (applying "translation theory" to the 
Takings Clause). 
18. See UVILLER& MERKEL. supra nofe I, at 296 n,6. 
19. The authors rely on Professor Rakove's work several times in the book. Id. at 80, 177,246 
n.9, 273 n.140, 2 9 2  n.54. 
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Uviller and Merkel seem not to realize that original ism has quite differing 
and competing strains or, if they do, they do not consistently keep within one 
method or another. Their erratic methodology renders it hard to respond to 
their interpretive claims since they might, for example, present evidence of 
intent that, while valid as far as it goes, is irrelevant to the public meaning of 
the text or, at a minimum, is not dispositive. 
As it tums out, the obvious source of this confusion siems from the fact 
that the authors are not themselves originalists, although they never disclose 
this to the reader.20 They therefore fall into the large class of no norigina lists 
who make originalist arguments, one assumes, to persuade others who care 
more about original meaning than they do. This probably describes every 
opponent of the individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment 
who offers historical evidence that this interpretation is in error.21 Even the 
professional historians who insist on a crabbed originalist interpretation of 
the right to bear arms, a right of which they disapprove, would never think to 
apply this method to limit other constitutional rights that they Iike.22 
If, however, as the authors themselves believe, courts need not and often 
should not follow original meaning, then courts are perfectly free to adopt a 
robust individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment even if this 
should contradict its original meaning. Uvilter and Merkel do not, of course, 
consider this implication of rejecting originalism. 
So far as I could tell, the authors present no new cvidence of the original 
meaning of the Second Amendment and confine themselves to reliance on 
20. I learned for the first time that they are not originalists during their talks at the symposium 
on their book held at the William & Mary School of Law. Until that moment, I had assumed from 
the book that they were. I was perhaps misled by their statement near the beginning of the book 
that: "Our historical approach is simply this: we take seriously the words chosen by the drafters, and 
seek their meaning to the ratifying generation." Id. at 37. Perhaps like other readers, I took this to 
describe their approach to constitutional interpretation. 
21. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History o/the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. 309, 369, 362-69 (1998) (arguing that "Madison's objecti ve in writing the Second 
Amendment was not to grant an individual right but to set limits on congressional power"); Keith A. 
Erhman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: HUIIe You Seen 
Your Mil tio Lotely?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 24, 18-24 (1989) (concluding that Min the cOntellt of 
the Constitution, the militia was viewed as a state-organized, state-run body" and that "(t]his 
distinction between the militia as a state-organized body and as the entire citizenry at large is 
important in understanding the Second Amendment because one of the central claim s of those who 
oppose government effons to regulate firearms is that the 'militia' referred to in the Constitution 
simply means an armed citizenry at large"). 
22. I know of no historian or law professor who, in offering an originalist critique of the 
individual rights position, has ever used an originalist method to limit the scope of any other right in 
the Bill of Rights, though someone may have escaped my anenlion. Historian Jack Rakove, the 
author of Original Meonings: Politics and Ideas in the Making oj the Comtitution (1997), for 
ellample, has never claimed to be an originalist. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Words, Deeds, ond 
Guns: ARMrNG AMERlCA and the Second Amendment, 59 WM. & MARY Q. 205, 206 (2002) (,,(lIt 
would be difficult to identify any clause of the Constitution more open to the common sense 
objection that its modern interpretation should not be rooted in the concept of 'original intent' or 
'original understanding,' simply because firearms are now far more devastating than anyone in the 
eighteenth century could have plausibly imagined.,,). 
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secondary sources or evidence already well-known to Second Amendment 
scholars of all stripes. There is nothing wrong with offering a new interpre­
tation of previously discussed evidence, of course, but readers should not 
expect to find anything that has not been previously considered by other 
writers in the field. Nothing new has been uncovered to change the debate. 
And unfortunately for a book-length work, the authors do not treat compre­
hensively all the available evidence of original meaning. This is particularly 
regrettable as the quantity of such historical evidence is manageable enough 
that all of it could have been evaluated in the space of a monograph. 
Let me tum now from generalities to particulars, for it will come as no 
surprise to those familiar with my writings in this area23 to learn that I am not 
persuaded by the authors' originalist arguments and therefore disagree with 
their conclusions. Because most of the book is taken up by a lengthy, and 
largely uncontroversial, history of the militia before and after the adoption of 
the Constitution, along with a discussion of classical republicanism, the 
book's treatment of the Second Amendment is actually rather briee4 Their 
conclusion that the individual right to anns is conditioned on service in an 
organized militia rests on a few claims that I shall treat separately. 
First is the claim that "bear anns" had an exclusively military 
connotation. Second, that, as a textual matter, the first part of the amendment 
places a condition on the exercise of the right specified in the second part.2S 
Third, that the "Privileges or Immunities" of the Fourteenth Amendment do 
not include the protection of an individual non-militia-based right to keep 
and bear anns?6 Fourth, that the practical significance of finding the right to 
bear anns to be an unconditional individual right is to protect an absolute 
right to be free of any regulation whatsoever, no matter how reasonable. 
Though this last claim hardly seems relevant to the authors' historical claims, 
they repeat it in sometimes intemperate tones throughout the work.21 Finally, 
the authors conclude that the general militia referenced in the Second 
Amendment no longer exists?8 On all five counts, they err. 
II. Was "Bear Anns" Exclusively a Military Tenn? 
The authors claim that "Bearing anns implied making muster, equipped 
and ready for service; keeping entailed steady readiness to serve when called 
to duty:,29 For this proposition they reference with uncritical approval Garry 
Wills's essay in The New York Review of Books in stating that "bearing anns 
23. E.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kales, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second 
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996). 
24. UVlLLER&MERKEL,supronole I. al 24-27. 
25. Jd al 149-50. 
26. Jd al 204-07. 
27. /d. all, 9,11, ]7, 54, 8],169,197. 
28. Jd. al 109-44. 
29. Jd. al ]9. 
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had, from its earliest recorded employment and through the late eighteenth 
century, an exclusively military connotation.,,30 From Wills the authors con­
clude that "the verb 'to bear' ... would not have been used in the eighteenth 
century-as it would not commonly be today-to connote purely private use 
of arms.")[ 
It is not enough, however, to present numerous examples of the use of 
"bear arms" in a military context to demonstrate that this is its exclusive use. 
Claims of exclusivity are hard to establish empirically because it must be 
shown that there are no other competing uses of a particular word. Just a few 
counterexamples call such a claim into question and then force those making 
it to do a systematic survey to distinguish normal from abnormal or deviant 
uses. Individual-rights scholars have pointed to several instances of the term 
"bear arms" being used in a nonmilitary context.32 
A. Early Uses of "Bear Arms" Outside the Military Context 
One important example, overlooked by the authors, is A Bill for the 
Preservation of Deer drafted by Thomas Jefferson and presented by James 
Madison to the Virginia General Assembly in October of 1785.33 The bill 
prohibited the taking of deer under certain circumstances and ends with the 
following stricture: 
[A ]nd, if, within twelve months after the date of the recognizance he 
shall bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing 
military duty, it shan be deemed a breach of the recognizance, and be 
good cause to bind him a new, and every such bearing of a gun shall 
be a breach of the new recognizance and cause to bind him again.14 
Here "bear a gun" is clearly being used in a nonmilitary context, as it 
exempts military bearing of a gun from the prohibition imposed on those 
who previously violated the act. (Note, however, that even offenders may 
still "bear a gun" on their own property.) 
Garry Wills dismisses this highly inconvenient bill with some too-fancy 
footwork: "Not only is the context different from the amendment's, but the 
'bearing of a gun' is not the canonical formulation with a plural noun.,,35 As 
to the first part of this sentence, Wills fails to note that the statute which he 
claims uses the tenn in a different context, exempts military duty from the 
30. [d. at 194 (citing Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, 
at 64 (hereinafter Wills, To Keep and Bear Anns] (emphasis added)). For respo�s to Wills by 
Sanford Levinson, David C. Williams, Glenn Harlan Reynolds, and John K. Lattimer, and for 
Wills's reply, see To Keep and Bear Arms: An Exchange, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Nov. 16, 1995, at61-
64, 
31. [d. at 149. 
32. See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. 
33. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the Preservation of Deer (Oct. 31, 1785), in 2 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 443, 444 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
34. [d. (emphasis added). 
35. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supro note 30, at 64-65. 
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scope of its prohibition, showing that it would otherwise be included in 
"bearing a gun." In rejecting the relevance of this statute on the ground that 
the context differs, he also assumes his conclusion-that the Second 
Amendment was exclusively military-a conclusion based in part on his 
contention that "bear anus" is exclusively military. But the statute is offered 
precisely to show that the term "bear arms" had a nonmilitary usage, in this 
case that of hunting. So the statute undermines Wills's claim that the context 
of the Second Amendment is indeed different, and his reassertion of the 
"context" point to refute this inference is a non sequitur. 
As for the second part, Wills is echoing a point made earlier in his 
review that "[a]oe does not 'bear arm.' Latin arma is, etymologically, war 
'equipment,' and it has no singular fonns.,,36 Wills has been misled by a spe­
cies of language known to philosophers as a "mass noun."n Mass nouns like 
"equipment" are useful when you need a tenn that will describe a class of 
items without limiting yourself to particular types of the class. Take the 
word "luggage." You can say "pieces of luggage" or "suitcase" but there is 
no singular of "luggage" (Le., you do not say, hand me that "Iugg"). A "right 
to luggage" would not, grammatically, be a right that could only be exercised 
collectively or en masse. Though ostensibly plural in fonn, the tenn "anns" 
is functioning here as a mass noun. The Founders would not have wanted to 
use the plural of "gun," for example, because the tenn "anns" also includes 
edge weapons as well as weapons to be invented in the future. The fact that 
there is no singular of "anns" tells us exactly nothing about its application. 
Wills's argument might be dubbed a grammatical fallacy.38 
Even though Jefferson's bill concerns only one type of anns (guns), it 
refutes Wills's claim that "[o]ne does not bear arms against a rabbit.,,39 
However strange it may sound to his ears, it is undeniable that both Jefferson 
and Madison did not think it odd to say that one does "bear a gun" to hunt 
deer.4o So do others of their contemporaries, discussed below, whose state­
ments to this effect are dismissed by Wills and by the authors because they 
do not fit the authors' and Wills's opinion about the historical "context." 
36. [d. at 64. 
37. The New Oxford English Dictionary defines "mass noun" as "a noun denoting something 
that cannot be counted (e.g., a substance or quality), in English usually a noun that lacks a plural in 
ordinary usage and is not used with the indefinite anicle, e.g., luggage, china, happiness. 
Conb'aSted with COUNT NOUN." NEW OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1051 (2001). 
38. Another such gmmmatical fallacy is the claim that "commerce" in the Commerce Clause 
had a narrow meaning excluding manufacturing because you would not speak of manufacturing 
among the several states. But this awkwardness is caused by the meaning of "among the several 
states" that limits the type of aclivities to those that could be conducted across state lines. Though it 
is true that the original meaning of "commerce" did exclude manufacturing, this is established by 
direct evidence of usage and the gnunmatical awkwardness of substituting "manufacturing" for 
"commerce" in the Commerce Clause tells us nothing about its original meaning. Barnett, The 
Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, supra nOle 10, al I 12-13. 
39. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 30, al64. 
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying texl. 
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The authors (and Wills) fail to discuss the first learned treatise on the 
Constitution authored by jurist and law professor St. George Tucker in his 
annotated edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, published in 1803, and 
based on lectures that he gave in the 1790s:u There, Tucker offers the 
following example of judicial review under the Necessary and Proper Clause: 
If, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person 
from bearing arms, as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial 
courts, under the construction of the words necessary and proper, here 
contended for, would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the 
constitutionality of these means. But if congress may use any means, 
which they choose to adopt, the provision in the constitution which 
secures to the people the right of bearing arms, is a mere nullity; and 
any man imprisoned for bearing arms under such an act, might be 
without relief; because in that case, no court could have any power to 
pronounce on the necessity or propriety of the means adopted by 
congress to carry any specified power into complete effect.42 
Tucker here is clearly discussing an individual right to keep and bear anns 
outside of any militia context, and he ignores entirely the preface to the 
Amendment. 
Another important counterexample to their thesis that "bear aons" had 
an exclusively military meaning, one that the authors do discuss, is the rec­
ommendation of the minority report of the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention that the Constitution be amended to include the following: 
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves 
and their own State, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing 
game; and no law shall be passed for disanning the people or any of 
them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury 
from individuals; and as standing armies in the time of peace are 
dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military 
shall be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil 
power.43 
The authors readily concede that this proposal clearly uses "bear anns" 
to include both nonmilitary ("defense of themselves," "for the purpose of 
killing game") and military ("and their own State") contexts, thus 
4 L The omission is curious as Tucker is discussed in articles cited and criticized by Uviller and 
Merkel. They would have had to have skipped over this source in one article they discuss to reach 
the quotation from the later treatise by Joseph Story, the treatment of which they chose to discuss at 
some length. See UVlLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 30-31 (discussing the scholarly treatment 
of a Joseph Story passage by Barnett & Kates, supra note 23). 
42. I ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO 
TI-lE CONSTlronON AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF TI-lE UNITED STATES AND OF 
TI-lECOMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 289 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1969) (1803) (emphasis added). 
43. Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Minority Proposal (Dec. 12, 1787) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 182 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). 
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undercutting the claim that "bear arms" had an exclusively military 
connotation. But they repeatedly dismiss the minority report as reflecting 
"marginal Yoices,',44 a "disaffected minority,''"'s and "some radical,libertarian 
support for an unrestricted right to weapons. ,,46 They claim that the minority 
report's "view of arms-related rights did not represent majority opinion in 
Pennsylvania,''''1 adding heatedly that "the assertion of an individual right to 
arms for purpose.s beyond service in the lawful state militia may have reso­
nated with some groups of anarchic radicals, but that majority sentiment and 
enlightened reason failed to embrace constitutional claims for such a right in 
Pennsylvania.'>48 They even go so far as to claim that "[t]hese supporters of 
[a] constitutional right to own weapons for private pwposes were atypical 
even within the anti-federalist movement, and they remained insignificant 
within the nation as a whole.',4� One suspects from their vehement denuncia­
tion of these delegates that the authors think this proposal of the 
Pennsylvania minority hurts their case badly. 
But, for all this sound and fury, it is remarkable that the authors offer 
little, if any, evidence or secondary support for these claims about popular 
opinion.5o Perhaps they base these claims on the fact that this is a 
recommendation made by a "minority" of delegates to the Pennsylvania 
convention, but it is well known that several of the earlier constitutional con­
ventions were packed by the comparatively well-organized Federalists. The 
fact that this particular sentiment was held by a minority of delegates tells us 
next to nothing about whether it reflects the common view among 
Pennsylvanians at large. Further, this individualist view of the right to keep 
and bear anns could easily have reflected the view of the majority ·of dele­
gates themselves who nevertheless supported ratifying the Constitution with­
out amendments. Indeed, the strategy of ratification conventions proposing 
amendments to Congress developed later in the ratification process.5] 
44. UVlLlER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 82. 
45. rd. at 83. 
46. Id. 
41. rd. 
48. Id. at 85. 
49. Id. at 81; see also id. at 91 (referTing to "the radical fringe"); id. at 100 (refening to "a few 
radicals outside Congress"); id. at 241 n.71 ("(TJhese endorsements almost invariably issue from 
the pens of marginal, radical figures who did not represent the mainstream of either federal or 
antifederal thought."). 
50. The only related footnote references in the book are (I) to a Fifth Circuit dedsion, Uniled 
Slates v. Emerson, that does not characterize as radical or minority the listed voices that bunrcss an 
individual right to bear anns and (2) to pages of an ankle by Saul Cornell that contain no claims 
about majority versus minority sentiments. /d. at 241 n.71; see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 
203 (5th Cir. 2001); Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Slandard ModeJ. the Second 
Amendment, and lhe ProbJem of HislOry in Contemporary ConslillilionaJ Theory, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 221, 231-34 (1999) (discussing the constitutional perspectives of the Pennsylvania 
Antifederalists on the individual right to bear anns). 
51. The Pennsylvania convention, the second to ratify the Constitution, did so on December 12, 
1787. 2 DOCUMENTARY HtSTORY OF THE CONSnTIJTION OF THE UNtTED STATES OF AMERICA 21 
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Evidence is required to establish the authors' dismissive claims, but none on 
this point is offered. 
When characterizing the Pennsylvania minority report as reflecting the 
views of wild anarchic deviants, the authors fail to mention the wording of 
the right-1o-arms provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: "That 
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the 
state . . .  ,,,S2 This right was reaffirmed in the 1790 Constitution in a passage 
that reads: ''That the right of citizens to bear arms, in defence of themselves 
and the state, shall not be questioned."n In addition to using the same 
phraseology as the Pennsylvania minority, neither provision in these enacted 
state constitutions even mentions the militia. So there is good reason to be­
lieve that the Pennsylvania dissenters were merely elaborating the individual, 
nonmilitia-conditioned right to bear arms already included in their state con­
stitution. In fairness then, the Pennsylvania dissenters can hardly be 
"discount[ed] . . .  as the rambling catch-all compendium of one man bent on 
scuttling ratification"S4 without some evidence that this was so. 
Nor was the Pennsylvania minority alone in attempting to amend the 
Constitution to protect an individual right to arms not conditioned on militia 
service. Included in the minority recommendation of the Massachusetts con­
vention was this proposed amendment: 
[The) Constitution be never construed . . .  to prevent the people of the 
United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own 
arms; or to raise standing annies, unless when necessary for the 
defence of the United States, or of some one or more of them; or to 
prevent the people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly 
manner, the federal legislature. for a redress of grievances; or to 
subject the people to unreasonable searches and seizures of their 
. " persons, papers or possessions. 
(1894). The first state convention to append proposed amendments was Massachusetts--tbe sixth 
state to ratify-which voted for ratification on February 6, 1788. Jd. at 93-96. After 
Massachusetts, all of the remaining seven states except Maryland proposed amendments to the 
Constitution along with theif vote to ratify. Jd at 97. These proposals can also be accessed online 
from the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, at http://www.yale.edullawwebiavalon/18th.htm 
(click on "Ralification of the Consritution" fOf an individual stale) (last visited Oct. 17, 2(04). 
52. PA. CONST. of 1176, ch. I, art. XIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 43, at 184. The Vennont Consritution of 1177 contains identical language. VT. CaNST. of 
1777, ch. J, art. XV, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, 81 184. 
53. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21 (emphasis added), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 184. 
54. UV1LLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 270 n.9O. 
55. Massachusens Ratification Convention Minority Proposal (Feb. 6, 1788) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 181. This recommendation is in 
contrast with the Massachusetts state consritution thaI protecled only the right to beaT anns "for the 
common defence." MASS. CaNST. of 1780, pI. I, art. XVII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 183. 
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As in Pennsylvania, this proposal does not explicitly mention the militia. 
The right to keep arms appears among a list of purely individual rights, none 
of which are in any way conditioned upon service in the militia. 
In addition, the New Hampshire ratification convention officially 
proposed that the Constitution be amended to read that "Congress shall never 
disann any Cit izen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion."S6 
Uviller and Merkel grudgingly concede that this proposal "might support the 
argument that a private right to gun possession is protected."S7 It should also 
be noted that none of the other right·to-anns proposals made by New York, 
North Carolina, Virginia, or Rhode Island were expressly limited to "the 
common defence" or "the defence of the state, ,,58 though, as the authors note, 
the Massachusetts Bill of Rights was qualified in this way.S9 
Uviller and Merkel should be estopped from responding that the 
language in the Pennsylvania and Vermont constitutions does not reflect an 
individual right exercisable both within and outside of militia service, for 
their interpretation of these passages is inconsistent with such an argument.60 
When discussing the later Kentucky case of Bliss \/. Commonwealth, in 
which the court interprets the very same language in the Kentucky 
Constitution as protecting an individual right,61 the authors readily concede 
that it does indeed have this broader meaning.62 They respond by 
distinguishing the language on the ground that this wording differs from that 
of the Second Amendment.63 By striking down a law banning concealed 
weapons, they note that "the [Kentucky] Court of Appeals acknowledged a 
56. New Hampshire Ratification Convention Repon (JWle 21, 1788) (emphasis added), 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE Bill OF RiGHTS, supra note 43, at 181. The authors claim, again 
without evidence, that this proposal "sought to push the republic further than any of the olher states 
desired to go." UVlllER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 82. 
57. UVlllER & MERKEL, supra note I, al 82 (emphasis added). Even a single eumple of a 
patently individual right to bear arms rebuts a charge commonly made by collective-right 
proponents, and now by miliria-condirioned.individual-right proponents, that the unconditioned· 
individual-rights fonnulation is a pure invention of modem guo rights scholars with no basis in 
history. 
58. New York Proposal (July 26, 1788), reprinted in ThE COMPLETE Bill OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 43, al 181-82; North Carolina Proposal (Aug. I, 1788), reprinted in ThE COMPLETE Bill OF 
RiGHTS, supra nOle 43, at 182; Virginia Proposal (Jun. 27, 1788), reprinfed in THE COMPLETE Bill 
OF RtGHTS, supra nole 43, al 182-83; Rhode Island Proposal (May 20, 1790), reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BilL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 182. 
59. UVlLlER & MERKEl, supra note I, at 82. 
60. Others not 50 constrained mly conlend that "the defence of themselves" was still a 
collective notion referring 10 "the community," and such defense was to be done entirely withm the 
context of the militia. I address this claim-which is not made by Uviller and Merkel-in subpart 
11(0). See infro notes 115-39139 and accompanying lext 
61.  12 Ky. (2 Lin.)90,90(1822). 
62. UVIUElt &: MERKEL, supra note I, at 27-28. 
6). Id. at 28. 
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private, state constitutional right for purposes having nothing to do with 
militia service,,>64 
The authors also dismiss the 1846 Georgia case of Nunn v. State, in 
which the state judge found a law banning certain pistols to be unconstitu­
tional under both the Georgia constitution and the Second Amendment.6S 
Here the authors criticize the judge for not considering himself sufficiently 
bound by the "revered" John Marshall's earlier opinion in Barron v. 
Baltimore in which the Court held that the Bill of Rights applied only to the 
federal govemment.66 "[FJor those who seek a coherent doctrine," they 
write, "Nunn v. Georgia [sic] is a case of no importance whatever.,,67 But 
coherent doctrine is not why we look to Nunn. Rather Nunn is significant 
because it is inconsistent with the claim that the right to keep and bear anns 
existed only in the context of militia service. 
Moreover, in their dismissal of Nunn, Uviller and Merkel fail to 
appreciate that many people then viewed the Bill of Rights, at least in part, as 
declaratory of preexisting rights and therefore as good authority to anyone, 
including a state court, trying to ascertain what the fundamental rights of per­
sons might be.68 Strictly speaking, Barron merely deprives the rights speci­
fied in the Bill of Rights of federal protection as against state governments. 
The Court does not hold that these rights are inapplicable to the states, should 
state courts decide to apply them. However this issue is decided, the opinion 
in Nunn still stands as an example of the right to bear anns being interpreted 
as an individual right outside Ihe military context. 
Surprisingly, nowhere in their book do the authors discuss how the right 
to keep and bear anns related to the natural right of self defense, though the 
wording of the Pennsylvania Constitution and other statements invokes a 
right of "defence.'.69 Instead, the authors claim that the right to anns "did nOI 
readily lend ilself to Locke's rational and enlightened discourse about the 
nature of man and the entitlements appurtenant thereto.,,7o Scholarly litera­
ture is replete with observation that the righl to keep and bear anns was 
64. fd The authors men gratuitously observe that subsequent Kentucky constitutions expressly 
"allowed me legislarure to pass gun control laws." lei. This further modification of me text, 
however, supports the view mal die unmodified language protected an individual-right-free-of­
militia connotation. 
65. I Ga. 243 (1846). Tbe authors cite this case as Nunn II. Georgia. UVILLER & MERKEL, 
supra note I,  al 30. 
66. 32 U.S. 243, 247-5 1 (1833); UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 29-30. 
67. UVILLER& MERKEL,supra note I, at 30. 
68. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 147-56 
(1998) (descrihing "the declaratory theory" of the Bill of Rights). 
69. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. lX, § 21, reprimed in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
slipra note 43, at I84. 
70. UVILLER& MERKEL, supra notc I , at 164. 
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viewed as an extension of the fundamental right of self defense,?' but the 
authors cursorily dismiss this notion in their book. n 
The authors attempt to mitigate Nunn v. State by discussing the 1840 
Tennessee case of Aymette v. Slate.73 In Aymette, the court upheld a ban on 
the wearing of a concealed bowie-knife, reasoning that "[t]hese weapons 
would be useless in war. They could not be employed advantageously in the 
common defence of the citizens. The right to keep and bear them is not, 
therefore, secured by the constitution.,,74 Uviller and Merkel claim that the 
state constitutional provision in �uestion was "similar in form and words to 
the federal Second Amendment." S But unlike the Second Amendment (and 
the other proposed amendments and state right·to-anns provisions discussed 
above), the Tennessee constitutional provision �ualified the right to bear 
arms by the phrase "for their common defence,"? and the court places great 
stress on this language in the passage quoted by Uviller and Merkel. 77 As the 
authors acknowledge elsewhere,'s this language suggests a more military or 
mutual defense meaning. 
In contrast to the language of the Tennessee constitution, however, the 
U.S. Senate rejected a proposal to add the qualifier "for the common 
defence" to the language of the Second Amendment.79 While the authors 
dismiss the significance of the Senate's refusal on the ground that this quali­
fying language was redundant,SO their assertion requires independent proof 
that the unqualified right is already limited to uses of arms for the common 
defense and does not also include the use of arms by the people in defense of 
themselves, as several state constitutions specified. In other words, only if 
you assume that you have established the meaning of the right to keep and 
71.  See generally Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing Ihe Smoke from Ihe RighI to Bear Arms and the 
Second Amendmen/, 29 AKRON l. REv. 57 (1995); David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases, 27 AM. 
J. CR1M. l. 293 (2000). 
72. UViLLER& MERKEL, supra note I , at 166-67. 
73. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 152 (1840). 
74. ld. at 156. The authors arc wrong to claim that individual rights scholars are guilty of 
"Ii)gnoring the case from Tennessec." UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 27. It is widely 
discussed in the Second Amendment literature. E.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN 
BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSnnmONAL RiGIff 94 (1984). By contrast, Halbrook notes 
an earlier 1833 case, overlooked by the authors, in which the Tennessee court offered a broader 
meaning of the right-ta-arms provision in Tennessee's constitution: "By this clause of the 
constitution, an express power is given and secured to all the free citizens of the State to keep and 
bear arms for their defense, wi/haul any qualification whatever 0$ 10 Iheir kind or nature." Simpson 
v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356, 360 (\833) (emphasis added), quoted in HALBROOK, supra, a1 94. 
75. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 27. 
76. TENN. CONST. of 1836, art. I, § 26, quoled in AymeUe v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 
(1840). 
77. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 27. 
78. ld. at 104. 
79. [d. at 103. 
80. [d. at 104 (arguing that "invocation of arms bearing in the militia already clearly proclaimed 
the pUlJIOse of common defense to eighteenth-century cars"). But the Second Amendment does not 
refer to "anns bearing in the militia." 
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bear arms can you contend that this additional language was superfluous. 
Equally if not more plausible is the inference that the qualifying language 
might well have been rejected because it unduly narrowed the scope of the 
right. In the absence of any recorded debate, we just do not know. 
B. Evidence That the Right "to Keep " Arms is Not Military 
To determine original meaning, as opposed to original intent, the cryptic 
and unreported Senate deliberations are far less important than the existence 
of state constitutional right-la-arms guarantees that included the broader 
"defence of themselves" language. A member of the public in 1791 reading 
the Second Amendment would likely not assume that the unqualified right in 
the Amendment actually meant something narrower than the broad right to 
anns for both personal and collective self defense that was already protected 
by some state constitutions. 
Take, for example, the reaction to Madison's proposed amendments by 
Samuel Nasson, an Antifederalist representative to the Massachusetts ratifi­
cation convention held the previous year. In a letter to George Thatcher, a 
Federalist congressman from Massachusetts, Nasson wrote: 
I find that Ammendments [sic] are once again on the Carpet. I hope 
that such may take place as will be for the Best Interest of the whole. 
A Bill of rights well secured that we the people may know how far we 
may Proceade in Every Department then their will be no Dispute 
Between the people and rulers in that may be secured the right to keep 
anns for Common and Extraordinary Occations such as to secure 
ourselves against the wild Beast and also to amuse us by fowling and 
for our Defence against a Conunon Enemy . . . .  Sl 
Nasson then goes on to extol the virtue of popular resistance to a "foreign 
foe" and condemn standing annies in times ofpeace.82 Notwithstanding his 
concern for the common defense, Nasson nevertheless reads the right to keep 
arms in the Second Amendment as also a personal one, unconnected with 
militia service.83 Note also, that Nasson uses "arms" for hunting, in contrast 
with Garry Wills's assertions.84 
This quote goes unmentioned by Uviller and Merkel, though it appears 
in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United Slates v. Emerson,ss an opinion that 
they much discuss and disparage.86 Instead of letting readers make up their 
own minds about such contemporary statements, this highly inconvenient 
81. Letter from Samuel Nasson to George Thatcher (July 9, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: THE DOCuMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 260-61 (Helen E. 
Veit et a1. cds., 1991) (emphasis added). 
82. Jd. 
83. Jd. 
84 .  Wills, To Keep and Beor Arms, supro note 30, at 64. 
85. 270 F.3d 203, 253 (5th Cir. 200\). 
86. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note \, at 220-24. 
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direct evidence of original meaning is dismissed by the authors in a single 
conc)usory sentence: "Contrary to many commentators and to our own inter­
pretation, the court finds 'numerous instances' where the words were em­
ployed to connote private carrying for private purposes. Accordi�ly. they 
conclude that the term refers to carrying or wearing arms generally. 7 
An earlier letter from Massachusetts historian and pastor Jeremy 
Belknap to Federalist Paine Wingate, written in May 1789, evidences that 
NassaD was not alone in this individualist reading of the right to arms.ss 
Belknap writes of his pleasure with Samuel Adams's investiture speech as 
lieutenant governor in which Adams affirmed that: 
"[T]he people may enjoy well grounded confidence that their personal 
& domestic rights are secure." This is the same Language or nearly 
the same which he used in the (Massachusetts ratification] Convention 
when he moved for an addition to the proposed Amendments-by 
inserting a clause to provide for the Liberty of the press-the right to 
keep arms-Protection from seizure of person & property & the 
Rights of Conscience. 89 
As it turned out, none of these "personal and domestic" rights were 
included among the amendments proposed by the Massachusetts 
convention.90 Would anyone, however, fairly conclude from this omission 
that the liberty of the press or the right of conscience was supported only by a 
minority or radical fringe of the population of Massachusetts? More 
importantly, these two contemporary letters join the ranks of other direct 
statements about the public meaning of the Second Amendment and the right 
to keep and bear anns, indicating that the Second Amendment right protected 
a personal, individual right like the other rights in the Bill of Rights. 
These statements by Nasson and Belknap, along with the previously 
quoted proposal from the Massachusens minority, highlight a single fact 
overlooked by the authors and by others who now base their historical argu­
ment on the supposedly military meaning of " bear anns"; The Second 
Amendment also protects the right to keep anns. No evidence is presented 
by the authors to show that "keep" was a military tenn at all, much less ex­
clusively SO.91 These references to a personal, individual right "to keep 
anns" are significant, therefore, because even if "bear anns" did have an ex­
clusively military connotation. the individual and nonmilitary right to "keep" 
anns still colors the meaning of the Second Amendment as a whole, giving it 
a nonmilitary meaning as well. 
87. [d. at 222. 
88. Letter from Jeremy Belknap 10 Paine Wingate (May 29, 1789), in CREATING THE BtLL Of 
RIGHTS, supra nOle 81, at 241, 241. 
89. Id. (quoting Samuel Adams's investituK speech as lieutenant governor). 
90. Amendments Proposed by the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 6, 1788), in CREATING TlfE 
B[LLOr RlGHTS, supra note 81, at [4, 14-15. 
91.  !k� UVlllER &: MERKEL, supru note I, at 149. 
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Perhaps because the Second Amendment literature had not previously 
discussed the Nasson and Belknap statements, Wills fails to consider them in 
his exposition on the meaning of "to keep.,,92 The best counterexample that 
he can produce is a statement in which John Trenchard "advised that 'a 
competent number of them [firelocks] be kept in every parish for the young 
men to exercise with on holidays. ",93 That "kept" can be used in a military 
context, however, does not give the word itself a military connotation. 
"Truck" can be used in a military context too, but that does not make the 
word itself military, much less exclusively military. That arms can be "kept" 
in an armory, as of course they can, does not mean that they cannot also be 
"kept" at home.94 
Wills concludes: "To separate one tenn from this context and treat it as 
specifying a different right (of home possession) is to impart into the lan­
guage something foreign to each tenn in itself, to the conjunction of tenns, 
and to the entire context of Madison's sentence.,,95 But given his lack of 
evidence, Wills's argument concerning "to keep" must really boil down to 
his tenuous claim that "bear anns" is exclusively military and therefore "to 
keep" must be military when conjoined with it. With Nasson, Belknap, and 
the authors of the Massachusetts minority report, however, we have actual 
members ofthe public at the founding referencing the right to keep arms and 
describing it as a nonmilitary right. Appeals to "context" cannot silence 
92. It is typical in this debate for the individual-rights scholars to produce direct evidence of 
usage, which their opponents then attempt to shoot down, usually by assening some larger 
"context," rather than producing new direct evidence of their own. 
93. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 30, at 67 (quoting JOHN TRENCHARD, AN 
ARGUMENT, SHEWING, ntAT A STANDING ARMY Is INCONStSTENT WITH A FREE GOVERNMENT 
AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE CONSTITlJTTON OF THE ENGLISH MONARCHY 21 (1691)) 
(alteration in Wills's article) (emphasis added by Wills). Wills also offers a quote from Federalist 
15 in which Alexander Hamilton records that "the objection to standing annies was to 'keeping 
them up in a season of tranquility.'" {d. at 67 n.30 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 160 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 00., 1961» . Wills notes that "Ials an English noun, 'keep' 
meant the pennanently holdable pan of a castle . . . .  " Id. at 67 n.34. Fair-minded readers can 
decide for themselves if Wills is being sensitive here to "context," and whether these uses of "keep" 
in any way detract from the significance of the use of "kcep anns" by Nasson and Belknap. Or 
might Wills himself be guilly of the same foible that he accuses individual-rights scholars of 
manifesting-"seeking out every odd, loose, or idiosyncratic" use of II tenn "in defiance of the solid 
body of central reference," id. at 64, or of what he dubs thc "throw-in-the-Idtchen-sink approach?" 
Jd. at 65. 
94. It is perhaps useful to remember that, in 1995, Wills was writing before gun rights 
opponents had made the transition from the "collective right"-of-states interpretation of the Second 
Amendment to the new militia-conditioned-individual-right theory. Hence, he still is claiming that 
the original meaning of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights was to protect the rights of 
states to have a militia-the view now rejected by writers such as Uviller and Merkel. UV[LLER & 
MERKEL, supra note I, at 12. Additional evidence is needed to fully refute this claim. For a 
summary, see United States v. Emer$on, 270 F.3d 203, 236-60 (5th Cir. 2001). Wills's work is 
wonh mentioning, however, because writers like Uviller and Merkel still rely heavily on his New 
York Review of Books essay claiming that "bear arms" was an exclusively military term. UV[LLER 
&MERKEL,supra note I, at 27, 1Q4-{l5, 194, 296-97. 
95. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms,supra note 30, at 68. 
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these contemporary statements. If anything, conjoining the right to bear arms 
with the nonmilitary right to keep arms renders them both nonmilitary in Ihis 
context, but there is no reason to insist on so narrow a definition. 
These statements-like others relied upon by individual-rights scholars 
that I do not reiterate here96---are direct evidence of what the public thought 
the Second Amendment phrase "the right to keep and bear anns" meant. 
Unlike the authorities relied upon by Uviller and Merkel (or Wills), they are 
not statements merely evincing a concern for the militia, from which we are 
supposed to circumstantially infer what the "right to keep and bear arms" 
might have meant. These statements evidence what the specific words of the 
Second Amendment objectively manifested to real people. The dirty little 
secret of this long-running debate is that only one side has produced any con­
crete examples of actual statements from the founding era expressing that 
side's interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms and the Second 
Amendment. 
C. Evidence That to "Bear Arms " Meant to Carry Anns 
Several times the authors assert, once again without evidence, that the 
term "bear arms" was chosen because it did not connote the mere carrying of 
guns. "In late-eighteenth-century parlance, bearing arms was a term of art 
with an obvious military and legal connotation. 'Carrying a gun' lacks the 
implication of bearing anns and, of course, the Constitution nowhere men­
tions a 'right to carry a gun.,,,97 The 1785 edition of Samuel Johnson's A 
Dictionary of the English Language repeatedly defines "bear" as "carry.,,98 
After describing "bear" as a "word used with such latitude, that it is not eas­
ily explained," the dictionary lists its first meaning as "To carry as a burden," 
followed immediately by "To convey or carry," "To carry as a mark of 
authority," "To carry as a mark of distinction," "To carry as in show," "To 
96. For a useful compendium of examples, see Emerson, 270 F.3d at 236-59. Those who 
oppose the individual-rights interprelation love to deride the reiteration of the same examples, as 
though examples of usage wear out from overuse. See. e.g., Wills, To Keep ond Bear Arms, supra 
note 30, at 65 (noting that "Slandilrd Modelers" refer "again and again" to the Pennsylvania 
ratifying convention's minority VOle to place killing game among the objects of a right to bear 
arms). In contraSt, they offer no examples of founding-era views regarding Ihe Second 
Amendment, or the right 10 keep and bear anns, that conespond to the view that they claim 
everyone held. E.g., UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, al 109 ("To the ratifiers, the right to keep 
and bear arms was inextricably and exclusively bound to the maintenance of a militia . . . .  "). 
Instead, they use "context" to explain away and trump the contrary evidence. When it comes to 
historical evidence, however, you cannol beal something with nothing. 
97. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 26-27; see also id. at 149 ("The righl to anTIS is 
declared by the verbs, 'keep and bear,' a phrase carefully selected in preference to alternatives such 
as 'have,' 'own,' 'carry,' or 'possess."1. The authors offer no independenl evidence as to the 
"care" thai went into this verbal choice. See id. The argument that the phrase "keep and bear" must 
have been carefully chosen instead of these other words that connote a different meaning assumes a 
fact that must be shown: that these other words would indeed have connoted a different meaning. 
98. I SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (nol paginated) (photo. 
reprinl 1990) ( 1755). 
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carry as in trust," and «To carry in the mind, as love, hate.,,99 So "carry" 
seems to be the most prevalent synonym of "bear," The same is true for the 
first edition of Webster's dictionary, which defined "bear" as "[1]0 carry" and 
which mentions "to carry" nine times in discussing the term's derivation 
from other languages,lOO So far as Johnson and Webster are concerned, "to 
hear" simply means to carry. 
This usage is borne out in the context of the Second Amendment by the 
Supreme Cowt's earliest known reference to the right to anns. This refer­
ence goes unmentioned by the authors (and Wills), though Uviller and 
Merkel purport to comprehensively discuss the few times that the Supreme 
Court has discussed the Second Amendment, including even a television in­
terview with Chief Justice Warren Burger.lOl In his infamous opinion in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief Justice Taney denies that blacks could have 
been considered citizens of the United States for, if that were the case, then 
blacks would enjoy along with whites "the full liberty of speech . . .  and to 
keep and carry anns wherever they went.,,102 
In this passage, Justice Taney uses "carry" as a substitute or synonym 
for "bear" and implies that the right protected by the Second Amendment is 
to carry weapons wherever one travels, a right completely unconnected with 
active militia service.lOl Taney groups the right to keep and bear arms in the 
Second Amendment with the equally nonmilitary liberty of speech protected 
by the First Amendment.104 And he obviously thinks that his readers would 
share his interpretation of the Second Amendment, or his reductio ad 
absurdum for black citizenship would fail. 
The authors cannot have omitted Taney's opinion because of its late 
date or racist reasoning and outcome because they rely on the nearly-as-vile 
ruling in Uniled Slales v. Cruikshank, an even later opinion in which the 
Supreme Court frees some members of the Ku Klux Klan who were 
convicted of violating the civil rights of blacks in Louisiana by torturing and 
murdering them. 105 According to the reasoning of the Court in Cruikshank, 
cited approvingly by the authors,l06 the defendants could not have been guilty 
of violating the victims' rights under color of state law because the entire Bill 
99. ld 
100. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828) 
(not paginated) (listing "To cany" as the second definition out of twenty; the first definition-"To 
suppan; to sustain"-is less relevant in the context of anns). 
tot. UVfLLER& MERKEL, .fUpra note I, at 13. 
102. 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1856). 
103. See /d. 
104. See M. 
105. 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1875). 
106. UVILLER & M£RKEL, .fupra note I, at 14. 
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of Rights, including the rights of assembly and to keep and bear arms, applies 
only to federal, and not state, exercises of power.I07 
Although today we protect such liberties (a historically and 
incompletely) by "incorporating" them into the Due Process Clause, the 
protection of the right to arms against infringement by the states, as I discuss 
below in Part IV, is more properly included within the original meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 108 
Clearly. however. if the later doctrine of incorporation properly applies to the 
right of assembly, it can just as easily apply to the right to anns, Crnikshank 
notwithstanding. 
Some might object to the relevance of all the nineteenth-century cases 
that I have discussed for establishing original meaning of an amendment en­
acted in 1791, and 1 sympathize with the objection. The fanher in time that 
one gets from promulgation, the less germane is the evidence of public 
meaning. 1 offer these cases because nineteenth-century cases are discussed 
at length by the authors in their opening chapterlO9 and because they concede 
that these cases interpreting the language "in defence of themselves and the 
state" represent the antithesis of their view.llo This in tum is relevant to the 
meaning of the same language used at the founding in right-to-arms provi­
sions in the state constitutions discussed above. I I I  
Also, more recent cases are useful to establish the late development of a 
collective or states-rights view of the amendment-a view unknown at the 
founding and correctly rejected by the authors.112 Finally, Taney's opinion in 
Dred Scott refutes the authors' suggestion that the Supreme Court has never 
considered the Second Amendment to protect an individual right uncondi­
tioned on militia service. II) In this, its earliest known mention of the 
Amendment, the Court clearly did. 
D. Was "defence of themselves " Also Exclusively Military? 
Before moving on to the next problem with Uviller and Merkel's 
originalist argument, let me briefly consider a different militia-conditioned 
interpretation of "for the defence of themselves and the state" that they do 
not offer. As we just saw, Uviller and Merkel concede that the wording of 
the Pennsylvania minority report included a personal right to bear arms 
107. Croikshank, 92 U.S. at 552. The authors do not infoon the reader that the Croikshank 
court fOWld thaI the right of assembly also does not apply 10 the states via Ihe Fourteenth 
Amendment. UVILLER & MERKEL. supra nOle I , at 14. 
108. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying tex\. 
109. UVILLER & MERKEL. supra note I, at 9-36. 
IlO. ld at 12-13. 
I l l .  Set supra notes 52, 61-64, 76, and accompanying text. 
112. UVIUER& MERKEL, supra note 1, al 179. 
113. ld. al 13. 
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outside the militia context. 1 14 That is why they go to such lengths to 
marginalize these speakers. Olhers, however, might claim that the phrase 
"for the defence of themselves" was the equivalent of "for the defence oflhe 
community," a right that also was to be exercised solely in the context oflhe 
militia. 
Here is a brieflist oflhe problems with that claim: 
(I) First, and most importantly, r am aware of no direct evidence of 
anyone at the time of the founding asserting that "in defence of themselves" 
means "for the defence oflhe community." 
(2) As a textual matter. "in defence of themselves" seems most 
obviously to be simply the plural of the personal right of self defense, a usage 
that was appropriate given that the subject of the right is the plural tenn "the 
people." In other words, if the drafters wanted to use the tenn "the people" 
as they had in other amendments, and "the people" is the plural of individual 
person, how else would the right to bear anns for personal self defense be 
protected besides making the second tenn "themselves"? A drafter would 
not write "himselves" or "him or herselves." 
(3) Indeed, this same grammatical choice is made in the Fourth 
Amendment, which refers to the "right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects . . " .',IIS SO here "the people" is being 
used as the plural of individual person, as reflected in the use of the word 
"their"-just like the use of "themselves" in state constitutions. Similarly, 
the English Bill of Rights refers to the ri�ht of individual protestant 
"Subjects" to "have AnTIs for their Defence." 16 There is no difference in 
meaning between "their defence" and "in defence of themselves." 
(4) It is true that the founders used "no rerson" and "any person" in 
the Fifth Amendment to refer to individuals, 1 7 but this is a grammatical 
consequence of shifting from affinning that everyone has a particular right to 
a claim about particular individuals not being denied a right. In the absence 
of direct and compelling historical evidence to the contrary, nothing in the 
public meaning would tum on this grammatical flip between the Fourth 
Amendment, on the one hand, and the First, Second, and Fifth Amendments 
on the other. 
(5) Consider this language from the very same 1776 Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights in which the "in defence of themselves" language 
appears: 
1 14. See discussion supra subpan II(A). 
1 1 5 .  U,S. CaNsT. amend. IV (emphasis added). To forestall future debate on this point, 
"persons" in this passage refers to their bodies as distinct from their possessions. 
1 1 6. Bill of Rights, 1688, I W. & M. ch. 2, § 1 (Eng.) (emphasis added); see JOYCE LEE 
MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGIN OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 1 1 9  (1994) 
(describing the legislative history of this formulation, which lacked any mililia preface or 
condition). 
1 1 7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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[Tlhe people have a right to hold themselves, their houses. papers, and 
possessions free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants 
without oaths or afftmlations first made, affording a sufficient 
foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any 
person or persons, his or their property, nol particularly described, are 
contrary to thaI right, and ought not to be granted. I 1 8 
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Did the use of the tenn "themselves" imply that the reference here is to "the 
community" rather than to individual rights? Hardly. The last portion of this 
statute refutes any such suggestion. Nearly identical language appears in the 
1777 Vermont Constitution.1 I9 Other state constitutional protections from 
unreasonable searches refer to "every subject" with no apparent difference in 
meaning.120 Or consider this passage from the 1780 Massachusetts 
Constitution: "that the judges of the supreme judicial court should hold their 
offices as long as they behave themselves well; and that they should have 
honorable salaries ascertained and established by standing laws." 121 
(6) As I have already discussed, language expressing "in defence of 
the community" was readily available and in use in, for example, the 
Massachusetts Constitution, which referred to "a right to keep and bear arms 
for the common defense"l22--qualifying language that was proposed and 
rejected in the Senate as an amendment to the Second Amendment.123 
(7) Finally, this interpretation of "in defence of themselves" leads to a 
bizarre interpretation of the Pennsylvania minority report itself that Uviller 
and Merkel, and others, claim to be a pure (and radical, exceptional, and 
rejected) statement of individual rights. By this interpretation, even the 
Pennsylvania dissenters did not seek to protect an individual right of self 
defense! We would be asked to believe that they sought instead to protect 
the right to defend the community ("in defence of themselves"), the right to 
defend the state ("and their own state"-notice the use of the word "their," 
by the way, as in the Fourth Amendment), and the right to kill game, but not 
the right to anns for personal self defense. This interpretation would not 
118. PA. CaNST. of 1776, ch. I, art. X (emphasis added), reprinled in THE COMPLETE Bill OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 235. 
119. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. I I ("That the People have a Right to hold themselves, their 
Houses, Papers and Possessions free from Search or Seizure . . . .  ) (emphasis added), reprinted in 
THE COMPlETE Bill OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 235. 
120. E.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RlOHTS, 
supra ROle 43, at 234; N.H. CONST. of 1783, art. XXII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE Bill OF 
RlGHTS, supra nOIe 43, at 234. 
121. MASS. CaNST. of 1780, art. XXIX (emphasis added), reprinted in THE COMPLETE Bill OF 
RlOHTS, supra note 43, at 234. 
122. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
123. UV[llER & MERKEl, supra Rote I, at 103; see alsa supra notes 79-80 and accompanying 
text. 
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only be bizarre, it would contradict Uviller and Merkel's repeated aspersion 
that the Pennsylvania dissenters were weird radicals and anarchists because 
they asserted an individual right to keep and bear anns.124 
E. Evidence a/Congressional Usage 
By the end of the book, the authors gel a little carried away and assert 
that "[t]o the ratifiers, bearing arms unequivocally meant rendering military 
service."l2S As we have seen, the examples that they discuss and others that 
they omit include numerous uses of the tenT) "bear" outside the military 
context. With one exception, no quantitative evidence is presented here to 
show that these uses were aberrant. 126 The exception is found in a footnote, 
quoting an article by David Yassky in which he reports "searching a Library 
of Congress database containing all official records of debates in the 
Continental and U.S. Congresses between 1774 and 1821" and finding that 
"the phrase had an unambiguously military meaning.,,127 Yassky's quantita­
tive survey is highly relevant to the issue of whether the original public 
meaning of "bear arms" included a military connotation. It establishes this 
uncontroverted claim beyond any doubt. But as proof that the term had an 
exclusively military connotation-a much harder claim to establish-it is far 
from dispositive. The problem is to establish the relevant baseline in the da­
tabase that Yassky used. 
My own search of this database generally confinns that the discussions 
in which "bear arms" appears (not including references to the Second 
Amendment) in the period searched by Professor Yassky do indeed concern 
only military matters.128 But this cannot establish, as Yassky asserts, that 
during this period "the phrase [had] an unambiguously military meaning.,,129 
124. ld at 83. 
125. Id at 194. 
126. By quantitative, I mean a systematic survey of a database from which conclusions about 
nonnal and aberrational usage can be drawn. This is not to diminisb the type of evidence on which 
the authors rely. Often, such statements are all that is available and I have relied upon such 
evidence myself. See supra note 10 (referring to my reliance on statements of various panicipants 
in the historical period to detennine the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause). In the 
absence of quantitative evidence, however, assenions that a panicular view was "insignificant" or 
"mdical" OT a "minority" view-much less "the rambling catch-all compendium of one man bent on 
scunling Tatification"-are difficult to establish. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 81-83, 270 
n.9O. With respect to the right to keep and bear arms, the situation is worse, as many examples of 
contemporaries who viewed the right as personal and individual have been produced, while we have 
no example of a single person who stated that the Second Amendment meant what Uviller and 
Merkel claim that everyone but a few radicals thought it meant. 
127. David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and ConslilUlionaf Change, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 588, 618 (2000), quoted in UViLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 296 n.7. 
128. I used the same database as did Yassky, although the years covered by the database seem 
to have expanded since his search. A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional 
Documents and Debates, 1774-1875, 01 hltp:l/memory.loc.gov/ammemlamJawllawhome.html (last 
visited Nov. 2003). 
129. Yassky, supranole 127, a1618. 
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Why not? Because if only military matters were under discussion when arms 
were mentioned in Congress during this period, then it follows from this 
fact-and not from any exclusive meaning of the phrase "bear arms"-that 
all uses of the phrase "bear anns" during this period in this database would 
necessarily be military. 
To test this proposition, I searched for phrases that Uviller and Merkel 
might concede have nonmilitary connotations, like "carry arms," "possess 
anns," and "have arms" and found just one nonmilitary result.110 
Significantly, I also found no references at all in this database to "keep 
arms," other than one (garbled) reference to the Second Amendment.lli This 
finding further suggests both (I) that the discussions involving "anns" in this 
database during this period were exclusively about military matters, such that 
we would expect "bear anns" to be used only in its military sense, and (2) 
that "keep anns" did not have a commonly employed military connotation. m 
Professor Yassky's findings should not be surprising. Given the nar­
rowly interpreted powers of Congress during the era that he surveyed, 1774-
1821, it is hardly unexpected that congressional debates would be discussing 
arms only in a military context. Congress had neither the inclination nor the 
power to propose laws that would have affected the personal right to keep or 
bear arms outside the militia context. Besides, it was constitutionally barred 
from doing so by the Second Amendment. 
Furthermore, since Professor Yassky did his search, the Library of 
Congress extended its database to the year 1875, covering the tumultuous 
years before, during, and after the Civil War, when the personal, nonmilitary 
rights of blacks and others to keep and bear arms were perceived as threat­
ened from a variety of sources. Sure enough, four examples of the word 
"bear arms" from this era appear to refer to a personal right outside the con­
text of the militia.133 Each of the following examples substantiates the 
proposition that, when Congress was discussing nonmilitary matters that 
130. "Is it possible, he asked, that an anny could be raised for the purpose of enslaving 
themselves and their brethren? or, if raised, whether they could subdue a nation of freemen, who 
know how to prize liberty, and who have arms in their hands?" 2 lQNATIiAN ELUOT, THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPT10N Of TIfE FEDERAL 
CONSTllUfION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, al 
97 (2d ed. 1836) (statement of Theodore Sedgwick to the Massachusetts ratification convention, 
January 24, 1788) (emphasis added). Sedgwick's comment was made before the Second 
Amendment was even proposed, of course, but like others of this era and afterwards, he clearly 
assumes that individuals in a free state would possess or keep anns. 
131.  A second reference in this debate to "keep anns" purponedly appears in the right to anns 
provision of the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, .but is actually a mistranscription 
of the original, which is also available for comparison on the relevant page. 
132. I do nOI claim that "keep arms" could never be used in a military context, bUllhat any such 
uses are rare and there are clear instances-for example, the Nassan and Belknap statements quoled 
above--of "keep anns" referring to an individual right wholly apart from any active service in an 
organized mililia. See supra notes 8 1  & 89 and a\X:ompanying lext. 
133. See infra text accompanying notes 134--37. 
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concerned the right to anns, the phrase "bear anns" was deemed perfectly 
appropriate. 
On June 28, 1 856, Representative Alexander H. Stephens proposed a 
comprehensive list of individual rights as part of a lengthy amendment to the 
pending bill admitting Kansas into the Union, which stated: "And be it 
further enacted . . . [tJhe people of said Territory shall be entitled to the right 
10 keep and bear arms, to the liberty of speech and of the press, as defined in 
the constitution of the United States, and all other rights of person or prop­
erty thereby declared and as thereby defined.,,134 No mention is made of the 
militia, and a militia preface like that found in the Second Amendment is 
absent. "Bear anns" is clearly being used in a nonmilitary context. 
In 1861, Representative Clement Vallandigham of Virginia announced 
his intention to introduce the following legislation, the specific nature of 
which is not specified: 
A bill to regulate and enforce the writ of habeas corpus, and for the 
better securing the liberty of the citizens; 
Also, a bill to enforce the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures; 
Also, a bill to secure to the people the right to keep and to bear anns 
for their defence; 
Also, a bill to prescribe the manner of quartering soldiers in private 
houses in time of war; 
Also, a bill to secure the freedom of speech and of the press.135 
Here too, any militia preface is omitted, and "bear anns" is nonmilitary. 
In 1 864, Garrett Davis of Kentucky introduced a resolution containing 
the following in the Senate: 
14 . . . . That the present executive government of the United States 
has subverted, for the time, in large portions of the loyal States, the 
freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and free suffrage, the 
constitutions and laws of the States and of the United States, the civil 
courts and trial by jury; it has ordered . . .  arbitrary arrests by military 
officers, not only without warrant, but without any charge or 
imputation of crime or offence; and has hurried the persons so arrested 
from home and vicinage to distant prisons and kept them incarcerated 
there for an indefinite time; some of whom it discharged without trial, 
and in utter ignorance of the cause of their arrest and imprisonment; 
and others it caused to be brought before courts created by itself, and 
to be tried and punished without law, in violation of the constitutional 
guarantee to the citizen of his right to keep and bear arms, and of his 
134. H.R. J., 34th Cong., lSI Scss. 1126 (1856) (emphasis added). 
135. H.R. J., 37th Cong., lSI Sess. 102 (1861) (emphasis added). 
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rights of property . . .  ; all of which must be repudiated and swept 
b h  . I '"  away y t e sovereIgn peap e. 
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The militia is not mentioned in the litany of alleged violations of individual 
and personal rights contained in this resolution. The context is entirely 
nonmilitary. 
On April 19, 1872, President Grant addressed Congress in a lengthy 
message regarding the lawless activities in certain portions of South 
Carolina. The President listed numerous deprivations of individual rights 
arising "under the sway of [a] powerful combination[], properly known as 
[the] 'Ku-Klux-Klan[],' the objects of which were, by force and terror, . . . to 
deprive colored citizens of the right to bear anns . . . . ,,137 Clearly. this refer­
ence to a right to bear arms, unaccompanied by a right to keep arms, is out­
side the militia context. Such abuses of the privileges and immunities of citi­
zens of the United States138 is what motivated Congress to propose the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 139 
True, all these nonmilitary uses of "bear arms" occurred long after the 
founding, but any assertion that the meaning of "bear anns" had changed at 
some unspecified interval assumes what must be proved: that the phrase 
"bear arms" had at the founding an exclusively military meaning-especially 
when conjoined with a right to keep anns-that was subsequently broadened 
to include nonmilitary usages as well. Evidence that such a change occurred 
is nonexistent. 
In this regard, it bears rcpeating that neither the authors nor Garry Wills 
present a single example of any person from the founding era or immediately 
thereafter who suggested that the right to "keep and bear arms" was 
exclusively a military right. While there are numerous examples of the right 
being used more broadly, such as the statements by Nasson and Belknap 
quoted above,140 there is no record of anyone at the time asserting that the 
right in the Second Amendment was as narrow or conditioned as the authors 
claim. Three types of statements could directly support their empirical claim 
that the original meaning of the right to keep and bear arms was exclusively a 
military one: 
(a) A statement opining that the right to keep and bear arms in the 
Second Amendment is conditioned on the continued existence of an 
organized militia; and 
(b) A statement explicitly rejecting the importance of an individual 
right to keep and bear arms, independent of an organized militia; and 
136. SEN. J., 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54 (1864) (emphasis added). 
137. President Ulysses S. Grant, Address Before Congress (Apr. 19, 1872) (emphasis added), in 
H.R. J., 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 716 (1872). 
138. See infra nOles 160--73 and accompanying texl. 
139. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRJDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILLOF RIGHTS 71-72 ( 1986). 
140. SeesllpranOles 81 & 89. 
264 Texas Law Review [Vol. 83:237 
(c) A statement decrying the Second Amendment for having rejected 
the individual right to keep and bear arms for one's own self-defense as well 
as the common defense, in favor of a purely militia-conditioned right. 
No such statements are presented. Had Uviller and Merkel done so, it 
would have made them the first anti-guo-rights scholars to have produced 
direct evidence of anyone actually holding the view that they claim everyone 
(or nearly everyone) held.141 At this point no such direct evidence is known 
to exist. 
HI. The Structure of the Text 
None of the discussion in Part n is intended to suggest that the term 
"bear arms" did not also include a military connotation; rather, it is intended 
only to establish that the term had a broader meaning that the public would 
reasonably have attributed to the tenn unless it was expressly qualified, 
which the Senate declined to do. In addition, Part II illustrates that the right 
"to keep" anns had no obvious military connotation. If it establishes nothing 
else, the evidence presented in Part II shows that the unconditioned individ­
ual-rights interpretation of the amendment can be found in the historical 
record and is no invention of the NRA-an organization that Uviller and 
Merkel mention derisivelyl42--or of individual-rights scholars, who the au­
thors repeatedly disparage throughout the book as "advocates,,143 or worse, 
rather than historians. 144 
At its root, and despite the pages of historical narrative, Uviller and 
Merkel's argument that the Second Amendment fell silent is not based on 
any new or direct evidence of original meaning. Apart from ritualistic invo­
cations of "historical context," and various assertions about the meaning of 
"bear anns," the authors' argument rests almost entirely on their own analy­
sis of its wording. "[A]s a matter of textual analysis," they contend, "we 
regard it as highly significant that of the several great entitlements enunciated 
in the first eight Amendments, no other is hedged by a conditional or 
explanative c1ause."145 
Elsewhere they claim: "We have . . .  a clear and unequivocal expression 
of the linguistic context of the primary right in the introductory phrase that 
accompanies it.,,146 Obviously this is wishful hyperbole. If the right to anns 
had been made explicitly conditional on participation in the militia, we 
141. E.g., UV1LLER & MERKEL, supra nOle I, al 109 (''To the ratifiers, the right to keep and 
bear arms was ineXtricably and exclusively bound 10 the maintenance of a militia . . . . j. 
142. Id. at 205. 
143. {do al246 n.9. 
144. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text. 
145. Id. at 23 (emphasis added); see also id. at 35 ("(Hlistorical developments have altered a 
vital condition for the articulated right 10 keep and bear arms.") (emphasis added). 
146. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
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would not be having this debate. The authors claim that the Second 
Amendment "guaranteed the right to keep and bear arms in the mililia, .. 147 
but the last three qualifying words simply do not appear there or elsewhere. 
At onc point Uviller and Merkel go so far as to claim: "Had the two 
statements-regarding the importance of a militia and the right to arms-not 
been joined in this manner, it might have been possible to argue that even if 
the first declaration ceases to be true, the second is undiminishcd."148 Yet 
nonc of the precursors of the Second Amendment-including Madison's 
proposal to Congress-are worded in the grammatical fashion that the au­
thors find so significant. 149 This does not prevent them from insisting, with 
equal ardor, that these fonnulations too "expressly linked" the right to anns 
to militia service. ISO 
The Founders, however, were quite capable of expressly qualifying an 
individual right-indeed of qualifying a right by military service. They did 
just this in the Fifth Amendment when they specified the individual right not 
to be prosecuted without an indictment by the grand jury "except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger."ISI In other words, unlike the Second 
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment right to an indictment is expressly 
conditioned on whether or not a defendant is in actual militia service. And as 
already noted, the Senate rejected the proposal that would have expressly 
qualified the exercise of the right to be "for the common defence."m 
Eugene Volokh has chronicled how prefacing constitutional rights with 
affinnations of purposes was quite common in state constitutions of the 
day.1S) For example, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1783 read: "The 
Liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought, 
therefore, to be inviolably preserved."IS4 Lest any weight be placed on the 
147. Id. at 1 14 (emphasisadded). 
148. Id. at ISO. 
149. &e supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text; I ANNAUI OF CONGo (Joseph Gales ed., 
1789), reprin/ec/ in BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOITEN NrNTH AMENDMENT I I I  (1955) 
(''The right of the people to keep and bear anns shall not be infringed; a well armed and well 
regulated militia being the beSt set:urity of a free counlly: but no person religiously scl1.lpulou$ of 
bearing anns shall be compelled 10 render military service in person.). 
150. UVILlER & MERKEL, supra note I, al 83 (referring to the proposal by North Carolina al 
the ratification convention). 
IS I. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
152. UVILLER& MERKEL, supra note I,  al 103. 
153. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 793-95 
(1998) (explaining thaI these clauses "shed some light" on the Sewnd Amendment in that Ihey (I) 
show that the Second Amendment is fairly tommonplate, rather than strikingly odd; (2) rebul the 
claim that a right expires once its justification expires; (3) show that operative clauses are often 
"both broader and narTOwer than their justification clauses,'" IlOt dependent on the right's 
furtherance of its justifICation clause; and (4) '"'poinl to how the two clauses might be read together 
without disregarding either''). 
154. N.H. CaNST. Of 1783, an. XXII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE Blu. Of RIGHTS, supra nOle 
43, at 94. 
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use of a semicolon, the nearly identical passage from the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 reads: "The Liberty of the Press is essential to the 
security of freedom in a State, it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this 
Commonwealth. "ISS 
The authors note these state constitutions but dismiss this evidence on 
the sole ground that "the Second Amendment remains unique among the 
federal Bill of Rights."lS6 But this misses the significance of Professor 
Volokh's justification-clause evidence for the original public meaning of the 
Second Amendment. These state-constitutional-rights provisions show that 
"to eighteenth century ears" (using the authors' phrase), 1 S7 such language was 
not uncommon and, so far as we know, was not elsewhere interpreted to limit 
or condition the right that followed. The authors' denials notwithstanding, 
this evidence does indeed bear on the original public meaning of the Second 
Amendment. 
None of this is to suggest that the authors' purely textualist analysis is 
absurd. To the contrary, it is the most plausible argument that the gun-rights 
opponents have raised to date because they finally concede that the right was 
one held by individuals and not by state governments. ISS But neither is their 
analysis compelling. The fact that the right to bear and keep arms was not 
expressly conditioned on the Second Amendment's preface strongly suggests 
that it was not so conditioned. It is precisely when plausible doubts are 
raised about the proper interpretation of text that evidence of original public 
meaning becomes important. As we have seen, ample evidence exists to 
suggest that the right to keep and bear anus existed apart from active service 
in a militia for the common defense, and reasonable members of the public 
would have and did so read it. IS9 
Even if Uviller and Merkel are correct that the right to keep and bear 
anns is conditioned on the continued existence of a general militia-of-the­
whole, this raises the question of whether they are also right to claim that 
such a militia no longer exists, a claim to which I shall return after briefly 
considering two other problems with their treatment. 
IV. Was the Right to Keep and Bear Anus Among the Privileges or 
Immunities of Citizens? 
Whatever its proper scope, the right to keep and bear arms (like the rest 
of the Bill of Rights) was originally meant solely as a constraint on federal 
155. MASS. CONST. of 1780, an. XVI, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 
43, at 94. 
156. UVlLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 24. 
157. Cf id. at 156 ("twenty-first-eenJUIy ear.,"). 
158. See supra note 9 and aecompanying le)(l. 
159. See supra Pan II. 
2004) The Right to Keep and Bear Arms 267 
power; state power was not affected by its adoption. This structural feature 
of the original Constitution was fundamentally altered by the enactment of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. which dictates that "[0]0 State shall make or 
enforce any law which shaH abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States . . . .  ,,160 Was the right to bear anns among these privi­
leges or immunities? 
Uviller and Merkel vehemently deny this possibility.161 Textually, they 
argue that because the Fourteenth Amendment does not specifically refer to 
the right to keep and bear arms as a protected privilege Of immunity. the 
Amendment does not protect this righl.162 Of course no particular right is 
specified as a privilege or immunity, so this first objection would wipe the 
clause from the Constitution entirely. Even the Supreme Court in its atro· 
cious five·to·four decision in The Slaughter-House Cases did not go so far as 
to suggest that the clause had no application whatsoever. 16J 
Understanding the original meaning of ''privileges or immunities" 
requires evidence of public meaning. lIS' Unfortunately, the authors rely for 
their evidence solely on the work of Raoul Berger.165 While Berger never 
made up evidenc�. as did historian Michael Bellesiles,l66 a researcher should 
[60. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § I .  
161. In addition to the textual and historical arguments discussed here, Uviller and Merkel also 
stress !he fact that courts have uniformly refused to incorporate a personal right to arms into the 
Fourteenth Amendmcnt. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 198-99, 208. The principal purpose 
of this dcbate over the meaning of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, howeve:r, is to discern 
if this judicial stane:e: has been correct. 
162. Jd. at 197-98 ("Regardless of the intentions--cven the clearly expressed inte:ntions-of 
individual Framers, it is the text as ratified that counts, and the text of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(of course) does not �l1ect any such purpose."); id. at 198 ("Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not proclaim, 'The Bill of Rights, includmg a personal right to arms for private purposes such as 
self-defense, shaH apply against the states.'''). 
163. See 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1872) (citing as privileges of citizens of the United State:s the 
rights "to peaceably assemble and petition for red�ss of grievances, the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus" among others). I eritically examine the majority opinion in Randy E. Barnett, The 
Proper Scopeo/lhe Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 429, �8 (2004). 
164. BARNETT, REsTORING, supra note 9, It 89- 130. 
165. See UVIL ER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 200 ("tndeed, Professor Raoul Berger �minds 
us that the derivalion of the phrase 'privileges and immunities' strongly suggests that it refem:d 
only to rights of trade and eommerce."); id. It 205-06 (citing K(t]he eminent legal historian, 
Professor Raoul Berger{'s]" conclusion that "the first usc of the term-in the Articles of 
Confederation-made it pretty plain that the privileges �fern:d to were privileges of trade and 
commercc:'1; id. at 313 n.120 (attributing to Raoul Berger "a powerful counterargument, p�senting 
convincing evidence that Howard and Bingham spokc inconsistently, that they fr�ucntly 
contradicted themselves, that most members of Congress expressly rejected these views, and that 
Howard and Bingham did not command the respect of the mlinstream of the Republican pany") 
(citing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 182-85 (2d ed. (997» . 
166. �e James Lindgren, Fall From Groce: Arming America and Ihe Bellesiles Scandal, I I I  
YALE L.J. 2195 (2002) (book review) (pointing out 8ellesiles's fabrication of evidencc); James 
Undgren & JUSlin Lee Heather, Counting GUIU in Early America, 43 WM. &. MARY L. REv. 1177, 
1839-49 (2002) (demonstrating how Bellesiles rnisTeported the probate rewrds on which he 
purported 10 rely and that somc of the probate records he claimed to have examined do not exist); 
268 Texas Law Review [Vol. 83:237 
always independently check sources for context. In this case, Uviller and 
Merkel fail to address Michael Kent Curtis's refutation of Berger's thesis in 
No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 
an especially influential book that was also published by Duke.161 Though 
not every scholar has been completely persuaded by Curtis's refutation of 
Berger's thesis, his conclusions have been widely accepted and have re­
shaped the current debate over the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.168 Curtis has shown that the primary purpose of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause was to reverse Bo"on v. Baltimorel69 and extend fed­
eral protection against state violations of the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights, especially the right to keep and bear arms.!7(l The lack of any refer­
ence to Curtis's work-together with the paucity of their own sources­
severely undermines the authors' assertions about the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Even if Uviller and Merkel were correct about the founding, by 1868 
the individual right to arms was certainly not a militia-conditioned one, espe­
cially as free blacks and southern Republicans suffered abuses at the hands of 
white militiamen. As Chief Justice Taney's 1856 opinion in Dred Scott v. 
Sanford reflects, the right to bear arms was the right "to keep and carry arms" 
see alsa Joyce Lee Malcolm, Review: Arming America, 79 TExAs L. REv. 1657 (2001) (lambasting 
Bellesiles for "present[ing] a skewed and distoned selection of the records, misquot[ing] 
contemporary statements and statutes, provid(ing] inaccurate information, and repon(ing) erroneous 
counts of the particular probate collections he specifically cites"). Though Uviller and Merkel's 
book appeared after the disgraced Michael Bellesiles's scholarship began to be discredited, the 
authors repeatedly cite and discuss his work with favor, even emphasizing at one point Bellesiles's 
receipt of the now-revoked Bancroft Prize. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 58-59, 143, 279 
n.24, 286 n.78, 287 n.5, 292 n.54, 294 nn.55-57, 295 n.58, 298 n.20, 313 n.110 (all citing 
Bellesiles's work); id. at 292 n.54 ("In his Bancroft Prize book Arming America . . . .  "); Press 
Release, Columbia University, Columbia's Board of Trustees Votes to Rescind the 2001 Bancroft 
Prize (Dec. 16, 2002), at http://www.colwnbia.edufcu/newslOVI2IbancroftJrize.hunl (announcing 
the December 7, 2002 vote to rescind the Bancroft Prize originally awarded to Michael Bellesiles 
and reponing Bellesiles's violation of "basic nonns of acceptable scholarly conduct''). While the 
authors acknowledge some of Bellesiles's now-vindicated critics in a footnote, in the SaD1e footnote 
they minimize the Significance of the critics' contrary findings. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, 
at 292 n.54 ("Bellesiles's use of the probate data has come under severe scrutiny, and his findings 
and methods have been sharply criticized . . . .  However, other commentators . . .  have defended 
Bellesiles . . . In the interest of fairness, it should be added that Bellesiles's I.:onclusions in Anning 
America do not depend entirely, or even chiefly, on his analysis of probate data.''). 
167. CURl1S, supra note 139, at 1 13-29. 
168. See. e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: 
Reflections an Ackerman, Reconstrnction. and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 
108 YALE L.l. 2011, 2022 (1999) (characterizing Curtis's contribution to the academic debate on 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as "something pretty close to" certainty). 
169. 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
170. CURTIS, supra oote 139, at 173-74. In my writings, I have shown how "privileges or 
immunities" include the natural rights retained by the people as well as additional privileges 
established by the Bill of Rights. BARNEIT, RESTORING, supra note 9, at 60-68. As the right to 
keep and bear arms is included in the Bill of Rights, however, it is wmecessary to accept this 
historical daim to agree that it was included among the privileges or immunities of citizens. 
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wherever one went.111 Though Michael Curtis is no gun-rights advocate, he 
repeatedly references statements that include the right to keep and bear anns 
as among those rights protected by the Constitution,l72 For example, the 
Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, approved by a supermajority of Congress 
over Andrew Johnson's veto, provided that: 
[T]he right . . .  to have full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the 
acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, 
including the constitutional right of bearing arms, shall be secured to 
and enjoyed by all citizens of such State or district without respect to 
race or color, or previous condition of slavery ,173 
Uviller and Merkel contend that the militia-conditioned "Second 
Amendment, as adopted by the Founders cannot be surgically reconstructed 
as a purely personal right, the 'militia' as referred to therein cannot be rede­
fined as bands of private citizens.,,174 The copious historical evidence 
reported by Curtis and others175 makes it clear, however, that the 
"incorporation" of individual amendments from the original Bill of Rights 
into the Due Process Clause is an anachronism. When it comes to the origi­
nal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the true issue is whether the 
personal right of bearing anns was among the privileges or immunities of 
citizens that no state could constitutionally abridge. The overwhelmingly 
enacted Freedmen's Bureau Act exemplifies the fact that by 1866 the protec­
tion of the individual, non-militia-conditioned right to arms for personal 
security was understood to be a privilege or immunity of citizenship. 
V. Is the Right to Arms Subject to Reasonable Regulation? 
Uviller and Merkel repeatedly assert that finding the right to arms to be 
an individual right unconditioned on the existence of the militia is a radical 
claim because such a right would not be subject to reasonable regulation. 
Thus, they refer to the individual-rights position as entailing an "unbridled 
right,,,176 an "absolute right,,,177 "an individual entitlement immune from 
171. 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1856). 
172. CURTIS, supra note 139,at 52, 53, 56, 72,88, 104, III,  1 12, 138, 140-41, 164, 167, 178-
79, 187. 203, 217, & 238 (discussing references to the right to arms in the context of the drafting 
and ratifying of the FouI1eenth Amendment). 
173. 14 Stat. 176-77 (1866) (emphasis added). That the Act protected the right to bear anns 
solely from discriminatory treatment does not detract from the conclusion that the right is clearly 
among the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As Curtis has 
explained, the Amendment protects the right both from laws that discriminate among the people and 
from laws that abridge equally the privileges or immunities of all citizens. See CURTIS, supra note 
139, at 1 15-20;see also BARNETT, RESTORING,SUpra note 9, at 195-96. 
174. UVlLLER& MER.KEL, supra note l, at 201. 
175. See. e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENfH AMENDMENT, AND THE 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998). 
176. UVlllER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 9. 
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government curtailment,,,178 an "unfettered general license to carry 
weapons,
,,17!J an "unrestricted right to weapons,,,I80 an "individual license,,]81 
that "prohibits any interference,,]82 with a right that would be "immune to 
government restriction and reguiation,,,183 and "free of any government 
control of arrns."I84 
Despite these polemics, the authors know better. In a footnote referring 
to Laurence Tribe, Akhil Amar, and William Van Alstyne, the authors ac­
knowledge that: "Preeminently, three of the most respected members of the 
orthodox legal academy to embrace an individual rights reading of the 
Second Amendment emphasize that this right-like the other individual 
rights protected in the first eight amendments-should be subject to 
reasonable regulation."lss Disturbingly, the authors fail to mentionl86 that 
virtually all individual-rights scholars, including the others cited in the same 
footnote, hold the position that an individual right may be subject to 
regulation.187 Indeed, I know of no individual-rights scholar who claims that 
the Second Amendment is any more absolute than is the First Amendment. 
This unifonnity is evidenced by a 1993 advertisement taken out in 
major journals by "Academics for the Second Amendment" and jointly 
signed by most individual-rights scholars. ISS The text of this advertisement 
appears in an article cited by Uviller and Merkel earlier in the same footnote 
that concedes the reasonableness of Tribe, Amar, and Van Alstyne.'89 In this 
article, which Uviller and Merkel find important enough to criticize else­
where in their text, l90 the following sentence of the advertisement is 
ital icized: "Of course, the right /0 bear arms is no more 'absolute ' than is the 
177. Id. at II.  
118. ld. at 31. 
179. Id. at 54. 
180. ld. at 83. 
lSI. Id. al 86--87. 
IS2. Id. a1169. 
183. Id. at I. 
184. Id. a1 197. 
185. Id. at 245 n.4 (citing Laureoce Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Well-Regulated Militias. and 
More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, al A31, and William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and 
the Personal Right 10 Arms, 43 DUKE. L.J. 1236, 1253-54 (1994)). 
IS6. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 254 n.4; see also id. al 37 (describing the 
individual-rights view as holding thai ''now and forever, in military pursuits and all olhers, guns are 
an individual entitlement inunune from government curtailment"). 
IS7. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter 1986, at 143, 145-46 ("(R]easonable gun controls are no more foreclosed by the 
second amendmenl than is reasonable regulation of speech by the firsl amendment."). 
188. An Open Leiter on the Second Amendment, NEW REpUBLIC, Mar. 15. 1993, at 15 
(advertisement) (endorsing the individual-rights theory of the Second Amendment in a statement 
signed by, among others, law professors Akhil Amar, Charles Cantrell, Robert ConIol, Raymond 
Diamond, Nicholas Johnson, Sanford Levinson, and Nelson Lund). 
189. UV1LLER& MERKEL, supra note I, at 244 n.4 (citing Barnen & Kates, supra note 23). 
190. UVILLER & MERKEL, supro note l , aI30. 
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right to speak, to publish. or to assemble."191 This advertisement merely 
evidences the fact that most individual-rights scholars of the Second 
Amendment hold a view that the authors mysteriously attribute only to Tribe. 
Amar, and Van Alstyne.'92 For this reason, Uviller and Merkel are unable to 
produce a single example of any individual-rights scholar who contends 
otherwise. 
One suspects that they omit this fact about other individual-rights 
scholars-whom they never call "scholars," much less "respected"-so they 
can repeatedly belittle them as "advocates,,,19l a "dedicated band of 
individual rights advocates,,,I94 an "individual rights brigade,,[9S or "a 
growing entourage of individualist interpreters of the Second 
Amendment."I96 Indeed, when mentioning historian Professor Joyce 
Malcolm, whose book To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo­
American Rightl91 was published by Harvard University Press, they go so far 
as to mention that Bentley College, where she teaches, is "an undergraduate 
business school in Massachusetts.,,198 Though individual-rights scholars 
have come to expect such cheap shots from their academic opponents, it still 
disappoints. 
At this point, some readers may be scratching their heads and 
wondering, if an individual right to keep and bear arms is subject to 
reasonable regulation, what is all the excitement about? Why do gun control 
proponents not simply embrace the original meaning of the right and then 
propose what regulations they wish? The answer is simple. Were they to do 
so under current doctrine, such regulations would be subjected to the same 
scrutiny as laws rcstricting the liberty of speech and the press. Within the 
modem theory of constitutional rights, as articulated in the famous Footnote 
Fourl99 of United States v. CaroJene Products Co.: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
1 9 1 .  Barnett & Kates, supra note 23, at 1189 (quoting An Open Leller on lhe Second 
Amemimem,supra note 188) (emphasis added). 
192. UVlLLER& MERKEL, supra note I, at 245 n.4. 
193. ld al246 n.9. 
194. ld at 38. 
195. Id at II. 
196. Id at 53; see also id at 178 ("[W]e think il regrettable that [Levinson's] unpersuasive 
thesis has lent respectability to the outlaw libertarians who claim to be the legitimate guardians of 
American freedom."). 
197. MALCOLM, supra note 116. 
198. UVTLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 246 n.9. 
199. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 306 (Kennit 
L. Ha1l eI al. cds., 1992) (noting in an entry entitled "footnote four" that "[w]hat is probably the 
most renowned footnote in Supreme Court history appeared in a case that would otherwise be 
forgonen"). 
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amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth.2OO 
Despite this injunction, the Second Amendment has never been held by 
the Supreme Court to be among those specific prohibitions that shift the pre­
sumption of constitutionality. 201 The centrality of the doctrine articulated in 
Footnote Four to the modem theory of constitutional rights explains why 
gun-control proponents have expended so much energy to show that the right 
to keep and bear arms is not "a specific prohibition of the Constitution,,201-
proponents of gun control wish to avoid the scrutiny that Footnote Four 
would require. 
So here is the position held by individual-rights scholars that Uviller 
and Merkel fail to acknowledge, much less meet: The fact that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right means only that the government 
must establish the necessity and propriety of its regulations, much as it must 
do when adopting time, place, and manner restrictions on the freedom of 
speech.20J Further, the individual right bars the complete prohibition and 
confiscation of all private firearms suitable for self defense, a goal so radical 
that most gun control enthusiasts deny favoring it.204 In other words, prop­
erly construed, by permitting reasonable regulation while taking complete 
prohibition off the table, an individual-rights reading of the Second 
Amendment prevents rather than proposes a radical policy measure. This is 
evidenced by the fact that on three occasions Congress has passed a statute 
expressly recognizing the Second Amendment as protecting an individual 
right, unconditioned on militia service.205 
200. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added). 
201. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-65, 267�8 (1886) (refusing to incorporate the 
Second Amendment and other rights into the Fourteenth Amendment); William F. Lane, Public 
EruWngerment or Personal Liberty? North Carolina Enacts a Liberalized Concealed Handgun 
Statute, 74 N.C. L. REv. 2214, 2225 n.76 (stating that, although Presser has never been overruled, 
the Supreme Court has incorporated aspects of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments into 
the Fourteenth Amendment). Federal appellate courtS have repeatedly held that the Second 
Amendment does not apply to state and local gun control laws. See. e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 
F.3d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1995); Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 
729-31 (9th Cir. 1992); Quilici v. ViI1. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-71 (7th Cir. 1982). 
202. For a critique of this modem thwry, see BARNETT, RESTORING, supro note 9, at 224-52. 
203. See. e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (approving time, place, and 
manner restrictions of speech only if they "are content-neutral, are nalTowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication"). 
204. Though the denial may be disingenuous. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 23, at 1254-59 
(describing the prohihitionist agenda of the gun control movement). 
205. Firearms Owners' Protection Act § i(b), Pub. L No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (''The 
Congress finds that the rights of citizens . . .  to keep and bear arms under the second amendment to 
the United States Constitution [and other rights) . . .  require additional legislarion to correct existing 
firearms statutes and government policies."); Property Requisition Act of 1941, Pub. L No. 77-274, 
55 Stat. 742 ("Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed . . .  to impair or infringe in any 
manner the right of any individual to keep and bear arms . . . .  "); Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, 
14 Stal. 176-77 (1866) (defining "aU laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty" to include 
"the constitutional right of bearing arms"). See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets 
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VI. Is the Militia Gone? 
273 
Notwithstanding all the evidence presented above, suppose Uviller and 
Merkel are correct in their claim that the right to keep and bear anns in the 
Second Amendment was somehow conditioned on service in the militia. 
Even were this true, their case would still depend on whether the "militia," 
properly defined. no longer exists. Therefore, Uviller and Merkel's next 
most important claim after their assertion that the right to bear anns is condi­
tioned on the continued existence of the militia, is that the militia has been 
discontinued and thus the Second Amendment has fallen silent: 
[W]ith no contemporary descendent to inherit the Framers' concept of 
a republican militia, the incidental right of citizens to bear and to keep 
the arms necessary to the life of such a militia has atrophied; it has 
simply fallen silent in the midst of the tumultuous debate on the issue 
in today's world.206 
How then do they define the term "militia"? 
As we have recounted-and as all scholars agree-the founding 
generation of Americans conceived of a militia as a group composed 
of all free white males between eighteen and forty·five (except for the 
conscientious objectors and others entitled to an exemption), 
responding willingly, as needed, for the common defence, at the call 
of local authority, and above all, as a viable alternative to the feared 
standing army.207 
Now it is possible to quarrel with this definition. At the end, for 
example, the authors seem to build into the definition of militia that "above 
all" it must be a "viable alternative" to a standing army, suggesting that if an 
entity is not a viable alternative then it is not truly a "militia." Ifby "viable 
alternative" the authors have in mind something like an "effective 
substitute," they cannot mean this seriously. Such a definition runs afoul of 
the Constitution itself, which affirms both the existence of the militia and the 
power to create a standing army, as necessary for national defense.2os In the 
the Second Amendment: Declarations by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and 
Bear Anns, 62 TENN. L. REv. 597 (1995) (analyzing the congressional reaffirmations of the Second 
Amendment). 
206. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra nOle I, at 228. 
207. [d. at IS7 (foolnote omitted). 
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. IS (giving Congress the power "[t]o provide for calling forth 
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress InSWTections and repel Invasions"); id. art. I, 
§ 8, c1. 16 (giving Congress the power "(t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
Militia''); id. art. I, § 8, cL 12 (giving Congress the power "[t]o raise and support Armies"); see id. 
amend. V, cl. I (mentioning cases "arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger''). Uviller and Merkel acknowledge Congress's 
Article I, Section 8 powers in their book, noting that "{ulnder the Constitution, then, Congress was 
empowered to raise a professional army" and that "assuming Congress made such provision under 
Article I, Section 8, Clause I 5, the President would be empowered to call up the several state militia 
into the service of the United States to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress lnsurrections, and 
repel Invasions." UVtLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 77. 
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Constitution, a well-regulated militia is clearly viewed as an auxiliary to a 
standing army-the militia can be called into action either to augment the 
army or to act in their stead when regular forces are preoccupied with other 
maners or cannot be on the scene as fast as locals.209 
This caveat aside, Uviller and Merkel acknowledge, correctly, that the 
original militia to which the Second Amendment refers is not the select mili­
tia of the National Guard,2lD but instead is what they repeatedly caU the 
"militia-of-the-whole.,,21 1  Are they then correct to claim, as they do at 
considerable length,212 that the militia to which the Second Amendment re­
fers no longer exists-"that there is no contemporary, evolved, descendent of 
the eighteenth-century 'militia" on today's landscape,,?213 It turns out that (if 
one omits the unwarranted word "evolved" from this claim), according to the 
current laws of the United States as enacted by Congress, the authors are 
wrong. 
Section 3 I I of the United States Code, Title 10, entitled "Militia: 
composition and classes," reads in its entirety as follows: 
(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males 
at least 17 years af age and, except as provided in section 313  of title 
32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of 
intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female 
citizens of the United States who are commissioned officers of the 
National Guard. 
(b) The classes of the militia are -
(I) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard 
and the Naval Militia; and 
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of 
the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the 
Naval Militia.214 
209. See U.S. CONST. art. t, § 8, c\. 15 (giving Congress the power "To provide fOTcalling fonh 
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress InsUlTections and repel Invasions"); id. art. II, 
§ 2, cL I ("The President shall be Conunander in Chief of the Anny and Navy of the United States, 
and of the militia of the severnl States, when called into the aClUal Service of the United 
States; . . . .  "). 
210. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 141 ("As far removed as the Cold War National 
Guard was from the militia described in the Second Amendment . . . .  "). 
2 1 1 .  E.g., id. at 3 1 ,  32, 71, 119, 125, 1 34. 
212. Jd. at 109-44 (detailing the d(X;ay of the militia of 1789-1791 and the origin of the 
organized militia of today). 
213. /d. at 157. 
214. 10 U.s.C. § 3 1 1  (2000) (emphasis added). It should be noted how similar this provision is 
to the proposal by Henry Knox, which, as the authors note, "proposed to retain the militia-of-the­
whole in theory, but to divide it up into three corps according to age-an advanced corps aged 18-
20, a main corps aged 21--45, and a reserve aged 46--59" with only the advanced corps receiving six 
weeks of training per year. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 71-72. Compare as well the 
wording of this statute with that of the Militia Act of 1792 which defined "militia" to include (with 
some nalTOw exceptions) "each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective 
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So far as federal law is concerned, then, the militia-of-Ihe-whole continues to 
exist 
Given its obvious relevance to their central claim, what do the authors 
say about this statute? Actually, they fail to mention it.2IS Though they note 
the distinction adopted by statute in 1903 between the "active militia" and 
"an unorganized militia (the non-enrolled male population between eighteen 
and forty_five),,,216 they twice repeat a claim taken from a 19405 law review 
artic1e,217 that in 1933 "Congress made the National Guard part of the regular 
aony during peace as well as wartime . . .  and erased the word 'militia' from 
the War Department charts, changing the name of the supervisory agency to 
National Guard Bureau,,,m So far as J know, this claim is not actually false, 
but it certainly is misleading when used to suggest that the class of militia 
defined by stature in 1903 as "unorganized militia" no longer exists as a 
matter of federal law. To the contrary, we have seen that it continues to be 
recognized in the United States Code.219 
The authors might respond that this is not the "republican" militia that 
they and the Founders had in mind: a "well-regulated" militia that is to be 
properly trained and drilled.2M But the federal government retains the power 
to train and discipline the militia ifit so chooses.221 What the federal govern­
ment cannot do--if we are to rake the preface ro the Second Amendment 
seriously-or at least what the federal government has not done, is abolish 
the militia altogether rather than to leave it unorganized. Nor can Congress 
abolish the individual right to arms simply by failing to well-regulate the 
militia-of-the-whole. 
states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen yea�, and under Ihe age of forty­
five years." Unifonn Militia Acl of 1792, ch. 33, § I ,  I Stat. 271, 271, repealed by Dick Act, ch. 
196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903). 
215. Without noting its continued existence in federal law, the authors do connect the "common 
mililia" of the Founde� with "the unorganized militia": "In contrast to the National Guard, the 
unorganized militia-the shadow of the common militia so extolled by the frame� of the Second 
Amendment-has not been funded by Congress since at least 1903." UVlLLER & MERKEL, supra 
note I, at 143. A lack of funding, however, does not cause the militia to evaporate; rather, the 
militia is at present ''unorganized,'' as current federal law accurately describes it. 
216. ld at 134. 
217. Frederick Bemays Wiener, The Militia Clause o/the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REv. 181, 
209 (1940). 
218. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 33, 137, 243 n.99, 290 n.23 ("[LJawrnakers 
'eliminated the word "Militia" from the War Department organization by changing the name of the 
supervisory agency to National Guard Bureau."'). 
219. IO U.S.C. § 3 1 1 .  
220. Indeed, the authors mentioned "trained" and "organized" in one o f  their definitions of 
"militia": "By militia is meant a trained, organized, and anned collection of qualified citizens, save 
only those of conscientious scruple and others exempted from service by their states, called together 
from their normal pu�uits 10 respond 10 occasional and particular threats, internal or external, to 
community peace." UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I ,  .l1 228, 
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 16 (granting Congress the power "[t)o provide for organizing, 
anning, and disciplining, Ihe Militia''), 
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The irony is that, although the authors' entire thesis depends upon the 
presence in the Second Amendment of the militia preface, they fail to realize 
that the preface, iftaken seriously, would constitutionally bar the abolition of 
the militia-of-the-whole, thus fatally undennining their claim that the Second 
Amendment has fallen silent. No matter what Congress might do in the 
future, the militia-of-the-whole would continue to exist in a constitutional 
sense, despite its being unorganized and not well-regulated. 
Much of their book is devoted to discussing the obsolescence of this 
body-of-the-whole militia.222 They devote chapters to its early 
ineffectiveness, for example, in stopping the British invasion of Washington 
in 1812, colorfully noting that the British soldiers consumed the dinner at the 
White House that had been prepared for President Madison and his wife.m 
As for today's militia, they write: 
In the years since World War Ii, the role of a mass reserve in assuring 
national security has seriously diminished in consideration of the 
technical complexity of equipment and tasks required of a thoroughly 
professional modem anny, and because nuclear deterrence has made a 
mass war drawing on all the personnel reserve of the country unlikely. 
The need for a whole nation in anns has-in all likelihood, 
pennanently---disappeared.224 
"Indeed," they confidently assert, "it would be difficult to conceive of any 
institution less necessary to the security of the fifty free states at the 
beginning of the new millennium than the vanished common militia."m 
On September l Ith of 2001, however, the United States came under 
aerial attack by planes piloted by foreign nationals. Two planes struck the 
World Trade Center, destroying it and, with it, thousands of innocent civil­
ians inside.226 Another struck the Pentagon, killing hundreds of members of 
the armed forces.227 A fourth plane, United Flight 93, was heading for the 
nation's capital with the likely target being the White House228 or the U.S. 
Capitol building. It was stopped from reaching its target, but not by the 
Army, the Navy, or even the Air Force. Nor was it stopped by the National 
Guard or the armed eonstabulary of the District of Columbia. After all, these 
official personnel cannot be everywhere the nation is threatened. No, unlike 
1812, this time the White House was saved from possible destruction by the 
heroics of members of the "unorganized militia,,229 who, after learning on 
222. UV1LLER& MERKEL, supra note l,at ]7-144. 
223. Jd. at 120-21. 
224. Id. at 142. 
225. Id. a1 143. 
226. NAT'LCOMM'N ONTERRQRlST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/1 1 COMMISSION REPORT 
7-8 (2004). 
227. Id. aI9-1O. 
228. Id. a114. 
229. 10 U.S.C. § 3 1 1  (2000). 
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their cell phones of the attacks by other planes, acted in concert to protect the 
capital from a second successful attack on the same morning, at the cost of 
their own lives.230 
VII. Conclusion 
Uviller and Merkel's book adds no new historical evidence to the debate 
over the original meaning of the Second Amendment. Instead, resting their 
argument almost exclusively on historical "context" and parsing of text, they 
propose that the right to keep and bear arms was expressly conditioned on its 
exercise as part of a militia that no longer exists. This interpretation is belied 
by contemporaneous statements about the nature of the right and the meaning 
of the Amendment before, during, and after its ratification,
231 by evidence of 
later usage,232 by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,233 by 
repeated affinnations by Congress, 23� and by the current statutes of the 
United States,m 
Notwithstanding the authors' opinion that "it would be difficult to 
conceive of any institution less necessary to the security of the fifty free 
states at the beginning of the new millennium,,2l6 than the now�disorganized 
common militia, we may just need the militia again one day, as we did on 
September I I  th, When we do, it may well be under circumstances where it 
would be better if its members have access to their own weapons to ann 
themselves, Fortunately, as the evidence shows, the Founders had the fore­
sight to enshrine an individual right of the people to keep and bear arms in 
the Constitution when they added the Second Amendment. Though it has 
often been ignored by courts,217 and sometimes SQuelched by scholars like 
Richard Uviller, William Merkel, or Gany Wills who wish that it was not 
there, the Second Amendment has not been repealed and it has never fallen 
silent. 
230. NAT'L COMM'NON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON TIlE U.S., supra note 226, at 13. Lesi l be 
misunderslood, I do not offer Ihis example 10 suggeSI that airplane passengers should be anned or 
that a proper interpretation of the Second Amendment would make disarming them 
unconstitutional. I offer it only 10 show that Uviller and Merkel are wrong 10 assert that, because 
the nature of warfare has changed, the militia-of-the-whole is no longer, and will never again be, 
needed to assist in providing for the common defense of the United States. At the least, reasonable 
people can disagree with their claim. 
23 L See supra subparts II(A}-(D). 
232. See supra notes 61--68, 73-78, & IOS-13 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra Pan IV. 
234. See supra subpart II(E). 
235. Seesupra PartV. 
236. UVTLLER& MERKEL, supra note l, at I43. 
237. For a recent example of a court asserting the militia-condilioned interpretation of the 
Second Amendment, see Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060--61 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended). 
The opinion in Silveira had 10 be amended to correct its original reliance on the discredited work of 
Michael Bellisiles. Siiviera v. Lockyer, 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 800 (9th Cir. 2003). 
* * * 
